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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Motivation 
Over the course of the first 25 years of the Water Quality Act, the primary focus was on regulation 
of point sources with technology-based standards. The recent renewed emphasis on water quality is 
captured in proposed total maximum daily load (TMDL) rules. A TMDL identifies the amount of a 
pollutant that is allowed in a water body, allocates allowable pollutant loads among sources, and provides a 
foundation for achieving water quality levels. The TMDL program is characterized as an ambient 
regulation where regulation and reporting are more concerned with the in-situ quality of water bodies. The 
most important characteristic ofTMDL rules is the impact on nonpoint source regulation. 
James Boyd (2002) identifies a number of important challenges facing the implementation of 
TMDL rules in a critical review of the proposed TMDL rules. The list of important challenges includes the 
lack of correspondence between state boundaries and watersheds, which provides the foundation for 
jurisdictional disputes. This issue is important because the downstream segments could inherit water 
quality problems from upstream sources located in other states. Furthermore, if the case is that standards 
may differ across states, the conflicts may easily occur. Less stringent water quality standards upstream 
coupled with less effective implementation upstream can be the cause of impairments in a downstream state 
with stricter water quality standards. In this case, the proposed TMDL rules require states to identify a 
process for resolving disagreements between jurisdictions. 
An example of a region where jurisdiction conflicts appear to be evolving is the Illinois River 
Basin in eastern Oklahoma and northwest Arkansas. Significant growth in poultry production has been 
accompanied by water quality problems. The Illinois River Basin covers an area approximately equal to 
433,160 hectares; roughly 54 percent of the total basin is located in Oklahoma. The river corridor in 
Oklahoma is a popular tourist and recreational attraction and was the first river designated as wild and 
scenic by the state of Oklahoma. Annually, a large number of people float the Illinois River by canoe, raft, 
or kayak while an even larger number enjoy swimming, fishing, camping, hiking, birding, and hunting 
opportunities. The Illinois River is a source of drinking water for several municipalities, irrigation water for 
farms and nurseries, and a habitat for several state and federal threatened and endangered species (Bality et 
al., 1998). Tourism contributes a great deal to the economic base in the Basin, especially the portion in 
Oklahoma. A substantial amount is also derived from agriculture, plant nurseries, forestry, and gravel and 
limestone mining. The agricultural activities include cattle ranching and poultry operations, with the latter 
showing significant growth in recent years. 
The historical evolution of water policy in the Illinois River Basin with respect to Arkansas and 
Oklahoma is highlighted by controversy in recent years. For example, a controversy in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s involved the discharge of municipal water into the Illinois River by the city of Fayetteville, 
Arkansas. Given the river's designation as wild and scenic in Oklahoma, increased wastewater discharges 
from sources in Arkansas triggered a lawsuit by Oklahoma. This legal action resulted in a U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in 1992 that resolved the conflict in favor of Arkansas. The lawsuit was based on the 
proposition that Fayetteville must meet Oklahoma's water quality standards at the state line, but it was 
concluded that existing evidence did not prove that the city of Fayetteville violated Oklahoma water quality 
laws. In 1996 a report on Tenkiller Lake, which is downstream on the Illinois River, contained a 
recommendation for phosphorus reductions in the Illinois River Basin (Oklahoma Water Resources 
Board/Oklahoma State University, 1996). In 1997, the Arkansas River Compact Commission established a 
goal to reduce phosphorus in the Basin by 40 percent. 
The continued decline in water quality has led to discussion focused on developing and 
implementing a phosphorus standard. Three different phosphorus standards have been discussed: an EPA-
recommended eco-region nutrient criterion standard of 0.010 mg.IL; an Oklahoma Scenic Rivers 
Commission standard of0.020 mg.fl.; and a target level of0.0375 mg.fl., which is designed to control algal 
growth. Yet another proposal has suggested a standard of 0.05 mg.fl. The state of Oklahoma has decided to 
adopt the target level of 0.0375 mg.fl. 
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As things currently stand, both Oklahoma and Arkansas may remain far apart on the issue of water 
quality in the Illinois River Basin. Several questions have been raised: Is it possible for both states to reach 
an agreement? What is Pareto optimum for both states? What is a best strategy for both states? To find 
answers to these questions may be a first step to resolve the phosphorus problem in the Illinois River Basin. 
Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to propose a modeling structure to resolve the jurisdictional disputes 
on water quality between Arkansas and Oklahoma in the Illinois River Basin. Three options are considered 
from the viewpoint of theory and policy. The first case is that a side-payment is used. A side-payment is a 
way for Oklahoma to control the phosphorus emission from Arkansas. But the question of whether this 
option is reasonable and acceptable to Oklahoma must be examined. The second case is based on the use of 
an enforcement rule. The latter is a way for Oklahoma to improve water quality without additional 
abatement cost. The acceptability and reasonableness of this option for Arkansas must be examined. The 
third option is to use a negotiation scheme. It is an option never examined to resolve the phosphorus 
problem in the Illinois River Basin. It is important to examine how a negotiating scheme is different from 
other two options in its properties and payoffs for both regions. It is important to look at whether 
negotiation can overcome the limits of other options to resolve the phosphorus problem in the Illinois River 
Basin. The objective of this study is to identify the limits of initial policies and propose negotiation as an 
effective alternative. There are other important issues such as free rider or the reliability of information, but 
these issues are beyond the scope of this study and are not discussed. 
The organization of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter II presents a selected review of studies 
concerned with phosphorus problem and transboundary pollution studies. Chapter III explains the 
theoretical background and main modules to be used for modeling. Chapter IV introduces three options and 
proposes the modeling structure. Chapter V explains the data development procedure, model application, 
and the results of the numerical application. Chapter VI summarizes the discussion, and presents 
implications and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Common Studies 
The overriding concern in the Illinois River Basin for both Arkansas and Oklahoma continues to 
be land applications of poultry litter as the primary method of disposal. The primary sources of phosphorus 
in the Illinois River are derived from the land application of poultry litter throughout the basin along with 
phosphorus discharges from municipal treatment plants in the Basin. A number of studies have looked at 
the economic and environmental impacts of poultry litter generation and use of fertilizer as well as its 
disposal. 
There are studies by Govindasamy and Cochran (1995, 1998); Govindasamy, Cochran, and 
Buchanberger (1994); as well as Xu, Prato, and Fulcher (1993). A common feature of the model structures 
used in these studies is that poultry litter is treated as a factor of production. Thus, the model structures are 
concerned with the "derived demand" for poultry. 
The models of Govindasamy and Cochran (1995, 1998) and Govindasamy, Cochran, and 
Buchanberger (1994) focus more on poultry litter applications and pay less attention to nutrients, 
particularly nitrogen and phosphorus. Poultry is introduced into the model structures used in these studies 
through a balance equation that traces the use of poultry litter. The right-hand side of the equation shows 
the quantity of poultry litter produced in the watershed and is treated as a parameter. The left-hand side 
shows the endogenously determined uses of poultry litter. The uses are the amounts of litter applied to 
crops in the region as well as the amount shipped out of the watershed. No explicit consideration is given to 
nutrient demands in these studies. 
Xu, Prato, and Fulcher (1993) explicitly model the demand for nutrients and also consider the 
tradeoffs between litter, as a source of crop nutrients, and commercial fertilizers. The supply sources of 
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litter are treated as exogenous in all of these models. Among other things, it is assumed that the generation 
of poultry litter is proportional to poultry production. This implies that reductions in poultry litter require a 
proportional reduction in poultry production. An overriding concern is that the opportunity cost of 
adjustments to environmental policies may be overstated. 
Transboundary Pollution Studies 
The typical way of dealing with a river pollution problem is the unidirectional externalities 
approach. This approach assumes unique upstream polluters and unique downstream victims. Another way 
of dealing with the problem is a regional reciprocal externalities approach. This approach assumes that 
there is a common property resource with free access for many agents. This approach makes it possible to 
examine the case where all agents are polluters and victims at the same time. 
The phosphorus problem in the Illinois River Basin can be examined from the viewpoint of an 
unidirectional externalities approach. But this approach has become incompatible as targeted pollution is 
shifting from point source to nonpoint source. The sub-regions in the Illinois River Basin could be polluters 
as well as victims. It means the possibility of the latter to be applied to the Illinois River Basin as an 
alternative of the former. But such a viewpoint has not received attention in the relevant studies on this area. 
In recent years, the modeling of international negotiations on transboundary pollution has been 
focused. An early contributor is Maler (1989) who proposed the acid rain game formulation for 
transboundary air pollution. Kaitala, Pohjola and Tahvonen (1992) applied Maler's formulation to analyze 
the problem oftransboundary pollution between Finland and the Former Soviet Union. 
The significant shortcoming of these studies is that they have a global information requirement. 
Using global information implies that information about the entire emission abatement cost functions and 
entire deposition damage cost functions of the relevant regions are known. But it is not easy to estimate the 
entire costs due to wide changes in emission and deposition in the real world. 
Tulkens ( 1979) presented a model for gradual emission reduction using only local information. 
Chander and Tulkens (1991) suggested the general framework which is not based on the global information. 
The local information assumption implies that a player knows only its marginal abatement cost and 
marginal damage cost at any level of emission. Kaitala, Maler and Tulkens (1995) applied the acid rain 
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game model (Maler, 1989) with local formulation (Tulkens) to the air pollution problem among Finland, 
Russia and Estonia. The model of Kaitala, Maler and Tulkens (1995) is an improvement over other 
approaches, but the problem is an impractical assumption that the time scale is continuous. It means that the 
negotiation should be continuous. 
Germain, Toint and Tulkens ( 1996) suggested a negotiation model of discrete time approach with 
local information. They assume that a member of the coalition knows only its marginal abatement cost and 
damage cost at any level of emission. It is also assumed that the damage function is linear and emission is 
lower bounded due to the technological limit. The lower bound of emissions becomes lower as abatement 
technologies are developed and abatement proceeds. The lower bound of emission is updated by new 
information at each stage of the negotiation. The emission reduction target is also set at each stage of the 
negotiation. What is different under the negotiation is that the members of the coalition are required to 
reduce more emission which is deposited in another region. Such a cooperative emission reduction leads 
the participants to Pareto optimum. Aggregate costs become lower than the costs under a noncooperative 
Nash equilibrium. The saved cost is called ecological surplus. In their model, ecological surplus is used as a 
source of financial transfers between participants in the coalition. Ecological surplus sharing is made by a 
rule which is formulated by Chander and Tulkens (1991, 1992). Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1996) 
applied the model to negotiations on the acid rains problem in Northern Europe. Germain and Toint (2000) 
recast this negotiation algorithm using a quadratic damage function with the same data, but the result is 
similar with that of Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1996). 
The negotiation algorithm suggested by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1996) is capable of being 
applied to the phosphorus problem in the Illinois River Basin, because it is one of the most reasonable 
versions of reciprocal externalities approach. The essential module of Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1996) 
consists of local information, discrete time, and financial transfers. Among them, a factor of local 
information is based on the formulation suggested by Tulkens (1979). But the origin of the methodology is 
the theory of resource allocation processes established in 1960. Arrow and Hurwicz (1977), Malinvaud 
(1970) and Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin (1971) contributed to the foundation of this theory. The 
financial transfer is based on the formulation presented by Chander and Tulkens (1991, 1992). The other 
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factors such as damage functions and cost functions as well as the acid rain game are formulated by Maler. 
Chapter III reviews these modules as theoretical background. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Arrow and Hurwicz (1960) formalize the planning theory of Lange (1936). Prices are used in an 
iterative and decentralized resource allocation procedure. Malinvaud ( 1967) establishes the process that 
converges to a solution using a sequence of feasible plans with a monotonic property of the utility function. 
But this procedure was not a gradient process but a discrete-step. On the other hand, the dynamic process 
with public good is developed by Lindahl (1958). Malinvaud (1970) reformulated the Lindahl process. The 
gradual method in the environmental economic issue was developed by Malinvaud (1971, 1972), Dreze and 
Poussin (1971) which is called MDP process. Tulkens (1979) applies the resource allocation process to the 
economic-ecological system. Based on the MDP process, Tulkens (1992) formulated negotiations on a 
voluntary provision of public goods. Chander and Tulkens (1991) suggested an ecological surplus sharing 
rule. 
Lange-Arrow-Hurwicz Approach 
The purpose of planning in this approach is to find a resource allocation to maximize the objective 
function. Assume n firms and s commodities in the economy. The planning problem is 
maxU(Yi,""",Ys) s.t.-yi + f gij(xj)+ei ~o, i = 1,··,S 
j=I 
g!i (xi): amount of good i produced by firm J . 
-y;: inputs. 
f g!i (xi): total net output of good i. 
j=I 
e; : initial endowment of good i . 
(3.1) 
By the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, necessary and sufficient conditions for (y . . . y ) and (x . . . x ) are 
P's l''n 
(3.2) 
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i=I 
A;= 0: f g!i (xj )+e; - Y; :2: 0 · 
j=I 
i=1 
A;> 0: f g!i (xj )+e; -y; = 0 · 
j=I 
where (A,, ... , l,) are dual variables associated with the constraints in (3.1 ). 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
Now suppose that this economy is separately run by firm managers and a distributor, and A; is a 
price of good i . Managers maximize profits. A distributor maximizes the difference in the values between 
the objective function and the cost of the final demand vector. The managers' maximization problem is 
max fl;g!i(xj)=O 
j=I 
s.t. xj :2: 0, j = l,- · ·, n. 
The necessary- sufficient conditions for solution are 
Ls ag .. X. >0: A,.-Y =0· 
J I a j=I 'Xj 
~ ag .. 
x.=0:L.,l._J/_::;O· 
J j=l I axj 
The distributor's maximization problem is 
max U(y . ... y )-~ Xy. sJ. y. :2: 0 
,, 's i l l 
i 
The necessary- sufficient conditions for solution are 
j = 1,-·· ,n. 
Y; = 0: U; - l 1 ::; 0 . i = 1,- · ·, s . 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
(3.6)-(3.8) are identical with (3.2)-(3.3). The solutions obtained from (3.1) and (3.5)-(3.7) are same when 
the relevant functions are structurally concave. The same consumption and production vectors are chosen. 
Thus, the solution of (3 .1) is achieved if appropriate prices are quoted. The appropriate prices are calculated 
from an iterative procedure as follows. First of all, the adjustment of the final demand for good i depends 
on the difference between its marginal contribution to the objective function and its price. 
if Y; = 0 : U; - l; ::; 0 
otherwise 
Each firm adjusts its operations to raise its profits. 
(3.9) 
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~ 8g .. 
if X; = 0 : L., A; _Y :,; 0 
j=I axj (3.10) 
otherwise 
The price of a good is positively related to the excess demand. 
if ,i; =0: A; =0: fgij(xJ+e;-Y; ~O 
j=l (3.11) 
otherwise 
The information transmission mechanism is as follows. The centre sets prices and communicates 
them to firms and the distributor. Firms and the distributor calculate and inform the centre of demands and 
supplies. Thereby, the centre can calculate the price adjustment. These processes make it possible to 
converge to a solution to the problem (3.1). Thus, an optimal resource allocation can be found without 
receiving information about the production possibilities. Mathematically, these processes are interpreted as 
defining the gradient process to find the saddle-point of the Lagrangian corresponding to (3.1). 
Malinvaud Approach 
The planning problem analyzed by Malinvaud (1967) is as follows. 
y : vector of final demand allocated. 
e: vector of the endowments. 
x . e X. : constraints. 
} } 
xi : firm j 's production program. 
x. : set of all program feasible for j . 
} 
(3.12) 
At t th iteration, the constraint x1 ex; is used as an approximation to xj e xj. The production possibility 
sets are calculated by firms based on the prices announced by the central authority. Thus, the 
approximation to x. is defined by 
} 
The planning problem is rewritten as follows. 
max U(y) sJ. 0:5y:5x~+e, x~ ext, J=l,-··,n. (3.13) 
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x;.: firm j's responses at earlier iteration . 
.I 
The central authority solves this maximization problem and announces a set of prices ( dual variables A; ) 
corresponding to the solution. Firm} calculates profit-maximizing production program x and inform the 
J 
centre of it. The constraint is x1. e x 1- 1 at t th iteration of planning process defined by 
J J 
The centre establishes new approximations x 1 to the x .. The constraint x 1- 1 is replaced by X 11. , and then J J J 
the procedure is repeated. The procedure (3 .13) converges to a solution of the problem (3 .12). 1 
Dynamic Process with Public Goods2 
The process is a theoretical framework to explain how the economies to reach an equilibrium. The 
main factors of this framework are states of economy, solution concepts and processes. States of economy 
are defined by consumption, production, budget constraint, and institutional and behavioral assumptions. 
The typical example is as follows. 
The State of economy is described as a vector x = (y . . . y · z . . . z · z w) . It assumes that one 
- }' ' II' p ' n' ' 
public good z and one private good y ( Y; ;:::: O , z; ;:::: O ), and endowment w of private good. The 
consumers set is N = { i I i = I, ... , n} . The utility function U; ( Y;, Z;) is a C2 class quasi-concave function. 
The feasibility condition for economy is 
"' y. + w = "' 0). 
~iEN 1 ~iEN I 
The consumption of the private good is different, but that of public good consumption is the same. 
z; =z ViEN, w=g(z). 
The production is assumed as follows. 
1 Heal, G. (1986). 
2 Henry Tulkens, "Dynamic Processes for Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, 9 (1978): 163-20 I. 
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(3.14) 
(3.15) 
w = g( z) where dg > o, private good input w ~ O and public good output z ~ O . 
dz 
(3.16) 
A unit tax () ( () > O ), which is quantity of private good per unit of public good, is considered. 3 () ( () ) is 
. I 
called unit tax (individualized unit tax). 
Institutional and behavioral assumptions are as follows. Each agent i maximizes its own utility 
,.; (Y;, z;) = () ; the demands for private and public good are functions of () and m;. That is, Y; = i; ( ();, m;) and 
z; = s( ();,m;). Lump sum transfer I; of private good is incorporated. It is given to i if I';< o (taken from i 
if I'; > o ). Then, the budget set is rewritten as { (Y;, z;) I Y; + (}z; + I'; :,; m;}, and the demand functions are 
3 It is called unit tax by Tulkens. It has different names: price of the public good (Milleron, 1972), pseudo-tax-price 
(Samuelson, 1966), tax-price (Buchanan, 1968), contribution rate (Malinvaud, 1971), etc. 
4 It is the marginal rate of substitution of agent i between Z; and Y; . It can be interpreted as a price of z; in Y; or the 
marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for improvement in environmental quality. 
12 
Assumptions 
One public good Z , one private good y . Y; ;::,: O, z; ;::,: O. 
Endowment of private good m. 
Consumers set: N = { i I i = 1, ... , n} . 
Utility function: u; (Y; ,z;). C 2 class quasi-concave function. 
Production function: w = g( z) . dg > o. 
dz 
Private good input w;::,: 0. Public good output z ;::,: 0 . 
Quantity of private good per unit of public good (). 
Utility maximization 
( ) aui I az; {( ) 1 e < . > o > o} ( ) - e lr; . =~/ ' Y,,z1 Y1 + Z; - OJ1,Y1 - ,z; - ',r; Y,,z1 - . 
U; 8.Y; 
Demands 
z, ( t) = s ( e, ( t), w,) Y, ( t) = <; ( e, ( t), w,) 
Lump sum transfer of private good I';, 
Budget set { (Y;, z;) I y1 + Bz; + I'; ::; W;} , 
Rewritten demand functions y. = f"_ (B T), z. = !'. (B., T). 
I ':11 1' I l ':,, I I 
Process depends on the solution concept defined. 
Figure 3.1 Framework of Dynamic Process 
Solution concept is a problem of interpretation about econormc rationality depending on its 
definition. There are relevant issues such as existence, uniqueness and relations of solutions. The process is 
to explain how the economy moves from a given initial state to equilibrium which satisfies a defined 
solution concept. These discussions can be summarized as Figure 3.1. 
There are three basic processes: Lindahl (L) process, Lindahl-Malinvaud (LM) process and 
Malinvaud-Dreze-de la Vallee Poussin (MDP) process. But the processes are typically classified into LM 
and MDP (Tulkens, 1978).5 Among them, the first dynamic process with public good is the Lindahl (L) 
process. 
5 There are many solution concepts for economies with public goods as many classified equilibria as follows: 1) 
Noncooperative equilibrium (Buchanan ,1968; Malinvaud, 1969-72); 2) Bowen equilibrium (Bowen, 1944; Bergstrom 
and Goodman, 1973); 3) Fourgeaud equilibrium (Fourgeaud, 1969); 4) Pareto optimum (Samuelson, 1954), Pseudo 
equilibrium (Samuelson, 1966), Public competitive equilibrium (Foley, 1967); 5) Individually rational Pareto optimum 
(Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin, 1971 ); 6) Core allocation (Foley, 1970); 7) Lindahl equilibrium (Lindahl, 1919; 
Milleron, 1972); 8) Pseudo-Shapley value (Champsaur, 1975); 9) Pseudo-nucleolus (Champsaur, 1975); 10) Public 
equilibrium (Ruys, 1974); 11) Groves-Ledyard equilibrium (Groves and Ledyard, 1977) etc. In the case of 2, 4, 5, 7 
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Lindahl Process6 
This process assumes one public good, one private good; endowments w1 and w2 ; two consumers 
( i = 1,2 ), and producer. At starting point (t = 0), unit taxes vector is (e1,Bz) such that e1 +e2 = y. 
Demands for public good z; ( o) = t; ( e; ( o), w;) and private good Y; ( o) = <; ( e; ( O), w;) are obtained from 
utility maximization. Supply of public good z(O) is passive because of an assumption that the producer 
responds passively. If condition (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) are satisfied, then the process is terminated. If not 
the case, the process proceeds. When the change of unit tax is denoted by e = de; , it is defined as follows. 
dt 
(3.17) 
This system gives a solution of unit taxes B,(t), e2 (t). Then, unit tax affects the demand t;;(B;(t),m;), 
<;; ( e; ( t), wJ Consumer decreases (increases) its demand if e is higher (lower). The demand affects the 
unit tax in turn. The unit tax is higher (lower) if the individual demand increases (decreases). This 
adjustment is repeated until the state of economy satisfies the feasibility condition. At equilibrium, the 
consumption amount of the private good is different between agents with the same price, but the amount of 
the public good is same between agents with different price. 
Lindahl process is meaningful in the sense that it is the first dynamic process with public good. 
But it does not offer the convergence to an optimum. The utility change of the agent i is written as 
au. au. au. ( ) au. . . 0 1"f e· 0 7 
u.=-1 y·.+-'i.=-' y·.+1r.i. =--'B.z· u.< ;> · 
I ;:),, I a I ;:),, I I I ;:),, I I 
vyi Zi uyi vyi 
(3.18) 
Consider that the public good supply should equal the smallest demand, 
L -( L L. L L. l L) x = Y; ,yj ,z; ,zj ,z , w (3.19) 
and I 0, the process is defined. The difference between them is in the interpretation of economic rationality (Tulkens, 
1978). 
6 Erik Lindahl. Just taxation-a positive solution. In Richard Musgrave and Alan Peacock, editors, Classics in the Theory 
of Public Finance, pages 98-123. Macmillan, London, 1958. Malinvaud (1971). 
7 u; = oau; (-( e;z; + fJ;z;) + lr;Z;) 
'Y; 
= - OU; e.z. - OU; fJ.z. + OU; Jr.i. = - OU; fJ.z + OU; (1r.i. - e.z.) = - OU; fJ.z 
ayi l , OJI; , , ayi , , ay,. , , ay,. , l , I ay,. , 
( Jr i. - e.z.) = O by individual utility maximization hypothesis 1r = e .. I I l l I I 
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L L 
w =rz . 
the demand is not the smallest ;r; * (}; ( especially, ;r; (Y;L, 2 £) is sufficiently greater than B; ). This result 
contradicts u. < o if e. > o above. In other words, both agents are better off ( u. > o) as (} increases if z is 
-. I l l l 
not minimum. Both agents are worse off ( u; < O) as (}; increases if z is a minimum. This type of evolution 
of utility change may be impossible at the stationary state of an economy. As a result, the Lindahl solution 
will be the initial vector ( ()1 ( O), ()2 ( O)) . 8 
Initial state 
r·····~ Unit taxes ( ()1 (t), ()2 ( t)) s. t. ()1 + 82 = y . Endowments li.>1 , ro2 . 
Starting point at time t = O 
.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::. ····,············.·································· 
Demands Budget set 
z;(t)=((B;(t),li.>;) ···~ { (Y;, z;) I Y; + Bz; ::::; li.>;} 
Y; (t)= ~(B; (t),li.>;) 
.......................... ·.:.::::::::::::::: ........... ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::JNo::::::::::::: 
Directions of unit tax change 
8,(t) =a[ ({ £?(t),cq)-(( ~(t),03)] 
Optimum (Lindahl-equilibrium) 
Figure 3.2 Lindahl (L) Process 
8 Malinvaud (1971 ), p.102. 
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Lindahl-Malinvaud Process 
Malinvaud (1970, 1971) reformulated Lindahl's idea to resolve the absence of convergence to an 
optimum and the asymmetric treatment of the agents. The Lindahl-Malinvaud process assumes more than 
two consumers and one producer. It introduces lump sum transfers I'; where L 7; = o . 
iEN 
At the starting point, unit taxes vector is ( e1 ( o),. .. , e; ( o),. .. , e" ( O)) s. t. Le; ( o) = y . Lump sum 
ieN 
transfers vector is ( 7; ( o),· .. , :z; ( o),.. ·,'I;, ( o)) s.t. LI'; ( o) = o . Demands are z;(O) = ,;-( e; ( o), 7; ( o)) and 
ieN 
Y;(O) = ~(e; (o),7; (o)) Vi EN. Supply z(O) is an average of individual demand zi (the passive producer 
assumption is still valid). If condition (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) are satisfied, it leads to pseudo-equilibrium. 
If not the case, then the process in a change of unit taxes and lump sum transfers proceed. 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
This system gives the values of unit taxes vector ( Bi (t),. .. , B; (t),. .. , e,, (t)) and lump sum transfers 
vector ( 7; (t), ... , 7; (t), ... , T,, (t)) as solutions. Unit taxes and lump sum transfers vectors affect the demand 
S;(e;(t),7;), ~;(e;(t),:z;)in turn. That is, consumers adjust demand for zi and Y;· Producer adjusts supply 
to the change in the average demand z . A change in unit tax increases (decreases) if demand is greater 
(smaller) than average demand. A change in lump sum transfers compensate agent for the raise (or decline) 
in his individual unit tax. 
By the side condition y·. + e.z. +Oz.+ t = o and the utility maximization hypothesis e. = ;r., 
I I I I I I I I 
. _ au; . au; . __ au; (e· T. ) . 
ui - ;i,, Y; + a z; - ;i,, ;z; + i 
vyi z, uyi 
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. au; [ ( -)- ( -) J OU; ( _)2 < 0 9 U; = - i3Y; -a Z; - z z + a Z; - z Z; = - oy; a Z; - z - . (3.22) 
This result implies the property of non-decreasing monotonicity. In the LM process all agents are treated in 
symmetric way which is different from the case of the Lindahl process. 
Initial state 
Unit taxes (e1 (t),-··,B;(t),-··,B,, (t)) s.t. Ie;(O) = r · 
iEN 
Lump sum transfers ( 7; (t) ,- ·. ,J; (t) ,- · · ,7;, (t)) s.t. LI; ( O) = O 
iEN 
Supply assumption z(t) = average(z;) Vi EN 
Starting point at time t = 0 
Demands Budget set 
z;(t)=s(e;(t),:z;(t)) {(Y;, Z;) I Y; + Bz; + :z; ~ m;} 
Y;(t)= ~(B;(t),J;(t)) Vi EN 
Directions of unit tax and lump sum transfer change 
iJ; =a[s;(B;(t),:z;(t))-_!_ IsABj(t),~(t))] 
n jEN 
t; =-_!_ IsAeAt),~(t))e; 
n jEN 
Optimum (Pseudo-equilibrium) 
Figure 3.3 Lindahl-Malinvaud (LM) Process 
Malinvaud-Dreze-Poussin Process 
The Malinvaud-Dreze-Poussin process is different from the Lindahl process and the Lindahl-
Malinvaud process. First, it does not use unit taxes, utility maximization hypothesis and demand functions. 
Lump sum transfers are generalized to all commodities. Linearity assumption of the production function is 
weakened by convexity assumption. 
At the starting point, the state of economy is defined as 
9 From the directions of unit tax and lump sum transfer change iJ. = a (z - z), t = -ziJ and iJ.z. = a(z. - z)z., 
I I I 1 I I I I 
au. ( . . ) au. [ . J au. [ J it.=--1 B.z.+T =--' a(z.-z)z-ze. =--' a(z.-z)z.-za(z.-z). · 
I cyj I l I cyf l l I O)Jj l I I I 
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x( 0) = [y1 ( 0), · ·,y,, ( O);z1 ( O)· · ·,z,, ( 0); w( 0), z( 0)} 
Consumer's marginal rate of substitution is n:; ( O) = n:; ( Y; ( O), z; ( O)) . 
Producer's marginal cost is r(O) = dg(z(O)). 
dz(O) 
If L n:; ( o) =r ( o), the state x ( o) is an optimum. That is, there is no change. 
iEN 
If L n:; ( o) *Y ( o), the process proceeds as follows. 
ieN 
z(t) = i; (t) = a(I n:j (t)- r(t)J 
JEN 
Vi EN 
w(t)=r(t)z(t) 
where the set of distributive weights o; ~ O , L 0; = 1 ; adjustment coefficient a E ( O, +oo), t ~ 0 . 
ieN 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
The first equation (3 .23) is a formalization of the idea that the change of public good is determined by the 
discrepancy between the sum of expressed willingness to pay for the public good and the marginal cost. 
The second equation (3.24) is the consequential adjustment to the private good input to produce the public 
good. The third equation (3.25) implies the agent's allocation of the private good. Thus, the direction of 
change in the private good Yi depends on the expressed willingness to pay for the public good 
(-n; ( t) z (t)), the distributive weight 0;, and the squared error in the first order conditions. The squared 
error term plays a role of a device to guarantee that the feasibility condition holds in the process. 10 
This system gives the solution of x(t). This state affects the consumer's marginal rate of 
substitution n:; (t) and the producer's marginal cost y(t). The changes z(t), ±; (t), w(t) and Y; (t) are 
determined by n:; ( t) and y ( t) in turn. 
10 If the squared error term is not included in the equation, y·. = -n:.:i i EN. The feasibility condition is 
I I 
LY;+ yi = - In:;a(I n:j - rJ+ ra(I n:j - rJ = -a(I n:j - rJ2 < 0. That is, the process will violate the 
1EN 1eN JEN JEN JEN 
feasibility conditions if the squared error term is omitted. 
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Initial state 
x(t) =[y, (t),··,y11 (t);z, (t)···,z 11 (t);w(t),z(t)] 
Starting point at time t = 0 
.. · ... t ... 
. ....................... , ............ . 
Consumer's MRS Producer's MC 
iT; (t) = ;r; (Y; (t),z; (t)) (t)= dg(z(t)) 
r dz(t) 
...... ·························.:::,:: ...... 
. .......... , 
Yes 
. . 
ieN 
.... ·.·· .. :::··· .... :·.·.,~t?·.·.·.·.::: 
Directions of change 
z(t) = z; (t) = a(L ;r; (t)-r(t)j 
JEN 
w(t) = r(t)z(t) 
Y; (t) = -;r; (t)z (t) + 8;a(2: ;r; (t )- r (t)j2 
JEN 
Pareto Optimum \..,. ...... : 
Figure 3.4 Malinvaud-Dreze.,.Poussin (MDP) Process 
The utility change of the agent is 
This result shows that the MDP process has a non-decreasing monotonicity property when u; > O . This 
property implies that the utilities of all agents change in the positive direction and that there is an incentive 
for each participant in the process. The process converges to the Pareto optimum with individual rationality 
with respect to the initial state (allocation) when u; = O. 
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Modeling Trans boundary Pollution 12 
The assumptions and the framework are as follows. 
One private good x; ~ O and one public good (public bad) z ~ 0 ; 
Set of countries N = {ii;= 1, ... , n}, a common environmental resource is shared among them; 
U ·1· -" · ( ) au au t11ty~unct10n U; X;,Z , _; >0, _; >0; 
ax; azi 
Country i's willingness to pay for an improvement in environmental quality n. = Bujaz ; 
l aujaxi 
Production function J;(y.,p.)=0, BJ; >0• BJ; ~O, private good output Y; is accompanied by 
, , , ;i.. a 
VJ'; 'P; 
pollutant discharge P; ; 
Marginal cost in Y; of its discharge abatement y. = _ BJ;/ Bp; > o ; 
' 8J;/8y; -
Transferable amount of private good T (taken from i if T < O, given to i if T,. > O ); 
' ' 
Feasibility conditionx. = y. + T for country i and '°' x. = '°'Y· + '°' T for all countries; 
I I I ./...J I L..J l ./...J I 
Transfer function z=F(p"···p;,··p,,), z= LP;· 
n; = Y; at a non-cooperative equilibrium; n N ( = ~ ni J = Y; at a Pareto optimum. 
The non-cooperative equilibrium is not a desired optimum. Only the Pareto optima are considered. 
Modeling Negotiations 
Two methods are considered for the economic-ecological system to move from a noncooperative 
equilibrium to a preferred optimum. That is, global (one shot) method and gradual (sequential) method. In 
the one shot method, the optimum is directly computed from the system's model. It is implemented by 
12 Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens, "Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier 
pollution problems," European Economic Review, 36 (1992): 388-398. Henry Tulkens, "An Economic Model of 
International Negotiations Relating to Transfrontier Pollution," (Chapter 16, pp.199-212), in: K. Krippendorff, ed., 
Communication and Control in Society (Gordon and Breach, New York). 
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appropriate and/or incentive schemes 13 . It requires complete information on the preference, production ( or 
cost) and transfer functions. In the sequential method, computations are simpler and repeated over time. It 
is based on local properties of relevant functions. The changes are designed in such a way that repetition 
entails a sequence of states that converges to the desired optimum. The gradual method in environmental 
economic issue is developed from the planning or tatonnenment approach for public goods (Malinvaud, 
1970-1971; Dreze and Poussin, 1975). Tulkens (1979) applied the resource allocation process to the 
economic-ecological system. Planning or tatonnenment approach is a branch of the theory of resource 
allocation processes (Arrow and Hurwicz) as explained at the beginning of this chapter. It describes the 
agents' action without a planner or an auctioneer. For this reason, this model is used in modeling 
negotiations on a voluntary provision of public goods (Tulkens, 1992). The statement of the process is as 
follows. 
(3.26) 
(3.27) 
(3.28) 
(3.29) 
(3.30) 
Equation (3 .26) is the change of discharge in country i . At a Pareto optimum, pi = o, otherwise p1 * o. 
Equation (3.27) implies that the ambient quality change i, which is assumed to have a simple additive 
form, is determined by the pollutant discharges. It represents the ecological feasibility. Equation (3.28) is a 
change in abatement cost. It represents the technological feasibility. Equation (3.29) is an adjustment of 
domestic private good production. It represents the consumption feasibility. Equation (3.30) is the net 
transfer. It consists of three terms. The first term is an amount received by country i . The second term is 
the amount to be paid by country i. Third term (z:,rN -ri)2 is the ecological surplus. c5i is country i's 
JEN 
fraction of ecological surplus which is constant parameter. 
13 Maler ( 1990) 
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Negotiation 
Each country i provides information: 
au /oz Jr.=--'-, 
I ou)oxi 
Directions of change 
P; = -( 7Z" N -r;)' i = 1,. .. 'n. 
Change in environmental quality and private good output 
i = - IP; Y; = yJJ; 
Adjustments in private good output 
x;=Y;+'I'; 
Net transfers 
• II 2 y; = -yipi -;,rii +oiI(nN -rj) 
j=I 
Pareto optimum 
Figure 3.5 Modeling Negotiations 
In the negotiation, each country provides information on its willingness ;,r;(t) to pay for a marginal 
improvement in the environmental quality z(t) and the marginal cost yi(t) of discharge reduction p;(t). A 
discharge change pi is calculated by given information. The changes z of environmental quality and .Y; 
of abatement cost in the private good are determined by the sum of discharge changes P;· With pi, i and 
given o , the net transfers t are calculated. The transfers are given to i if t > O and taken from i if 
I l I 
t < O . If the country i does not join the coalition for the negotiation, there are no net transfers ( t = O) and 
I I 
no change in the utility ( u = o ). If the country i joins the coalition, it is possible that t > O and u > o 
; I ; 
because of the possibility that ;,r N ( = t nj) > Y; if ;,ri = yi . This shows that there is an incentive for country 
i to join the coalition for the negotiation. In addition, a Pareto optimum can be reached through 
negotiations. 
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Modeling Cost Sharing 
This is a problem of an ecological surplus sharing rule. Chander and Tulkens ( 1991) defined the 
distribution profile 5 = (5 ... 5 . ... 5 ) as follows. 
1' ' I' ' 11 
(3.31) 
Rewrite (3.30) using (3.31), 14 
. ;r. (t) ~ . 1 
'I'; = -yJJ; +~(t) L.JjlJj, 1 = ,. .. , n. JrN pl 
(3.32) 
Rewrite (3.29) using (3.32) and (3.28), 
(3.33) 
Equation (3.33) shows that the consumption cost (foregone consumption) change X is proportional to the 
preferences intensity n; of country i relative to the total preferences intensity ;r N for environmental 
quality. The idea of cost sharing rule is that the ecological surplus is distributed depending to the 
contribution of each country to the improvement of environmental quality. 
Another relevant issue is the correctness of information which is provided by the members of the 
coalition. Three cases are discussed in literatures: First, incorrect information on its preferences n; and/or 
14 n From (3.30), where O:,; 5; :,; 1, L 6; = 1, 
i:::.l 
= -r;P; -n; (-I P;)+5;I(nN -r} using (3.27) 
j=l 
= -r;P; -n;I(nN - rj) + b;:t( JrN - rj r 
j=I 
=-y.p·.-1r.°"'(n -y.)+ n;(t) ~(1r -y.)2 ·: 5. = n;(t) in(3.31). 
I I IL..., N j (t) L..., N J I (t) 
7r N 1=1 7r N 
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cost Y; ; Second, no participation; Third, the direction of change of the pollutant discharges, P;, determined 
by its own interest. Local games were introduced to analyze these behaviors in the 70s. 15 This issue is also 
important, but it is not discussed in the dissertation. 
Cost Functions 
Consider the abatement cost function c (E) in terms of emission E where C denotes the total 
I I I I 
abatement cost and E; denotes the emission from the region i . The abatement cost function is assumed to 
be a c2 class convex function. Using the quadratic approximation technique, the abatement cost function 
can be evaluated at E; as follows. 
Y; is total abatement cost. a; is the marginal abatement cost. /J; is a parameter to be estimated. This form 
of abatement cost function is assumed in the negotiation model because of its appropriate properties. 
Damage Functions 16 
To derive damage function, assume that the environment has well-defined characteristics, then 
YER'". 
Y : Ambient concentration. 
R : Consumers' preferences. 
Assume that the physical changes in environmental quality due to changes in human activities, then 
environmental interaction function F can be defined as follows. 
15 Roberts, J., "Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, 46, 
no. 2, 1979: 283-292; Chander, P. and H. Tulkens, 1991, "Strategically Stable Cost Sharing in an Economic-Ecological 
Negotiation Process," Paper presented at the Second Congress of the European Association of Environment and 
Resource Economists, Stockholm, June: CORE discussion paper no. 9135; Chander, P., 1987, "Cost-Sharing Local 
Games in Dynamic Processes for Public Goods," in: B. Dutta and D. Ray, eds, Theoretical Issues in Development 
Economics (Oxford University Press, India); Chander and Tulkens, "Theoretical Foundations of Negotiations and Cost 
Sharing in Transfrontier Pollution Problems," European Economic Review, 36, 1992: p.397 
16 Karl-Goran Maler, "Damage Functions and Their Estimation: A Theoretical Survey," Environmental Damage Costs, 
OECD, (1974): 223-252; Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green, "Microeconomic Theory," 
Oxford University Press, 1995; Geoffrey A. Jehle and Philip J. Reny, "Advanced Microeconomic Theory," 1998. 
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Y =F(z) (3.34) 
z : Activities. 
F: Environmental interaction function (physical damage function). 
Assume that environmental quality is a public good. Thus, vector Y has a property of a public good. It 
means that no one can change the quality only for himself. 
Utility maximization problem (UMP): 
u(c,Y) (3.35) 
A utility function u represents the consumers' preferences for private consumption and for environmental 
quality. It is assumed to be a C2 class function defined on R"+m . The n-vector c is net demands for private 
marketable goods and services. It stands for consumption if positive and supply if negative. 
Budget constraint is 
p: price vectors. 
w: wealth or lump sum income. 
p Tc : inner product of p and c . 
First order necessary condition is 
au 
u.=-· 
I acj 
a : Lagrange multiplier. 
The solutions to the UMP is the Marshallian demand functions c. 
c=c(p,Y,w). 
The indirect utility function V is obtained by substituting (3.38) into (3.35). 
v(p,Y, w) = u( c(p,Y, w),Y) 
Expenditure minimization problem (EMP): 
Min pTc si. u(c,Y)~u. 
This is the dual problem of the expenditure minimization at a given utility level ii. 
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(3.36) 
(3.37) 
(3.38) 
(3.39) 
First order necessary condition is 
/Ju;-P;=O (i=l, ... ,n) 
fJ : Lagrange multiplier. 
If the solution to the EMP is c·, the Hicksian (or compensated) demand function is 
h = c'(p,Y,u). 
The expenditure function is 
e(p,Y,u) = pTh(p,Y,u) 
By Shephard's lernrna, 
ae(p,Y,u)=h( y )· 
a i p, ,u 
'P; 
Taking derivative with respect to pj, 
_i_(8e(p,Y,u)J= 8h;(p,Y,u) = ac;(P;,Y,e(p;,Y,u)). 
apj api apj apj 
~= ac;(P;,Y,e(p;)) + ac;(P;,Y,e(p;)) 8e(p;). 
aPiP; apj aw apj 
Slutsky equation is 
_a_2e __ ac;(P;, Y, e(p;)) 8c;(P;, Y, e(p;)) ae(p;) = O 
apj aw apj 
or 
Thus, the expenditure function has properties as follows. 
Shephard's lernrna: ae(p,Y,u) = h (p y u). 
a l ' ' 1P; 
Relationship between Marshallian and Hicksian demand: 
c(p,e(p, Y,u)) = h(p,Y,u). h(p, v(p, w),Y) = c(p, w,Y). 
e : concave function in p . 
Slutsky equation: ~- ac;(P;,Y,e(p;)) ac;(P;,Y,e(p;)) ae(p;) = 0 . 
apipi apj aw apj 
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(3.40) 
(3.41) 
(3.42) 
(3.43) 
Symmetric substitution: 8h; = ahj . 
8pj 8pi 
If u is quasi concave in (p, Y), then e is convex in Y . 
Damage functions for one individual: 
The damage function is defined as what must be compensated to the individual as the environment 
deteriorates. Thus, the damage function for one individual is the compensating variation as 
CV(p,Y,u) = e(p,Y,u)-I (3.44) 
ii: predetermined level of utility. 
/: Consumer's income level. 
Assume three goods (labor supply, medical care and private good). Consider two situations of 
Y' and Y". Y' (Y") is a case that the individual is healthy (sick). The damage function is defined as the 
compensating variation as 
CV= e(p,Y",u)-I = °I,P; ( c; (p,Y",u)-c; (p,Y',I)) · 
i=l 
If the individual is sick, the sickness will prevent him from supplying labor c, . 
c~ (p,Y",u) = c, (p,Y",I) = o. (3.45) 
If the individual is healthy, he will not need to spend money on medical care c2 • 
C2 (p,Y',I) = 0 · (3.46) 
Assume that the income effect on the demand for medical care c2 is ignored. 
c; (p,Y",u) = c2 (p,Y",I) · (3.47) 
From the three equations above, the damage function will be 
CV= e(p,Y",u)-I = °I,P; ( c; (p,Y",ii)-c; (p,Y',I)) 
i=l 
= Pi ( c~ (p,Y",u)-c, (p,Y',I) )+ A ( c; (p,Y",u)-c2 (p,Y',I) )+ A ( c; (p,Y",u)-c3 (p,Y',I)) by (3.45) 
Pi (c; (p,Y",u)-c2 (p,Y',I)) = p 2c2 (p, Y",u) by (3.46) and (3.47). 
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This implies that the compensating variation consists of the loss in wage income (-Pic1 (p,Y',J)), an 
increase in expenditure for medical care (Pzc2 (p,Y",u)), and an increase in expenditure for private good 
consumption ( Ac; (p, Y", u)- p3c3 (p, Y' ,I)) to compensate the individual for the sickness. Thus, estimating 
individual damage functions is a problem of estimating the individual expenditure functions. The problem 
is that the computed expenditure function from the individual demand is not a function of environmental 
qualities but a function of prices. 
Assume that the utility function is u(c,r,Y), rERk where ris a quality vector of goods and 
services. The quality r may be lower (higher) by the pollution (maintenance). Suppose that x ER" is a 
vector of goods and services used as inputs for maintenance. Thus, the quality vector is a function of x and 
Y as r = g(x,Y) . The rewritten demand function is c = (c,x) . The rewritten utility function is 
u ( c, Y) = u ( c, g ( x, Y) ,Y) . The rewritten utility function is different from the previous one, because it 
includes maintenance. 
Now consider the production side. The pollution affects the production possibilities. This may lead 
to the decrease ( Af) of the profits of the firm. This change may appear on the individual income and 
damage functions. The demand price for environmental quality is defined as 
0 =-~ 
1 8Y 
(3.48) 
Social damage functions: 
Assumptions are as follows. Consumer set is { sl 1, ... , s}. All markets are cleared. All prices reflect 
social costs from which environmental costs are subtracted. Social welfare function represents the 
preferences of the decision maker. The decision maker uses the damage function to make it possible to 
judge whether a change in the human activity vector z is desirable or not. 
Suppose that revenue R and the damage D are yielded by the change in z . The desirable change 
occurs only if R > D . The human activity may affect different persons differently. Considering the 
difference in the preferences of individuals, it should be possible to use the income redistribution as a tool 
for decision maker to change the situation for individual. It is called lump sum transfers. Two cases are 
considered. The one is a case that lump sum transfers are feasible. The other is a case that lump sum 
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transfers are not feasible. However, the basis for the decision maker to change the situation is only Pareto 
criterion. 
When the lump sum transfers are feasible Pareto criterion can be explained as follows. First, the 
aggregated expenditure function is defined as the sum of the individual expenditure functions. 
s 
e(p,Y,u1, ... ,us)= Ie'(p,Y,u') (3.49) 
s=I 
The total lump sum income (wealth) I is 
s 
I= Ir (3.50) 
s=I 
The social damage function is defined as 
s 
CV=e(p,Y,u\··,u5 )-l= Icv' (3.51) 
s=I 
CV' : compensating variation for individual s • 
If the revenue R , which is yield by the human activity z , is greater than the compensating variation CV , 
the decision maker can transfer revenue so that every individual can have necessary or more amount to 
compensate himself. But if R > D does not hold, the lump sum transfers are not feasible from the viewpoint 
of Pareto criterion. 
When the lump sum transfers are feasible the social welfare function is as follows. Assume that 
preferences on the distribution of real income, environmental quality, and the idea of consumer sovereignty 
represent the preferences of the decision maker. These preferences are assumed to be represented by an 
indirect social welfare utility function. 
V(p,Y,/1,··,J') 
ByRoy'sidentitywhen av >0 (s=l,-··,S)isassumed, 
ar 
av =-f,c: av' i=l,··,n. 
ap' s=I I ar 
Equation (3.53) can be rewritten with equation (3.48) as 
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(3.52) 
(3.53) 
(3.54) 
This equation says that the welfare change, which is due to a change in environmental quality, equals the 
sum of the individual preferences on the environmental quality. This is a condition for the existence of a 
welfare function W ( ci, ... , cs) such that 
(3.55) 
v'(p, Y,ls): indirect utility function of individual s. 
The social expenditure function can be defined in the similar way as the individual expenditure. 
Expenditure minimization problem is 
Min p 7 ± cs s.t. w(u 1(c 1 ,Y),·· ·,Us (cs ,Y)) ~ [} 
s==I 
[J : give social welfare level. 
Its solution is the social compensated demand functions cs . 
cs =cs*(p,Y,D), s=l,-··,S. (3.56) 
The social expenditure function is 
E(p,Y,U) = PT cs' (p,Y,U) · (3.57) 
To examine the relationship between the social expenditure function and the individual expenditure 
function, assume that 
us =u 5 (cs*(p,Y,D),Y), s=l,-··,S. (3.58) 
This individual utility function depends on the consumptions which are adjusted by the lump sum transfers. 
The social expenditure function is the sum of the individual expenditure functions as 
s 
E(p,Y,U)= Ies(p,Y,us) (3.59) 
sc:=l 
The social damage function is written as 
CV=E(p,Y,U)-1 (3.60) 
Estimation of social damage functions: 
The environmental quality as a public good does not have a market in which the individual 
preferences can be revealed. Thus, the demand function and the expenditure function cannot be derived 
based on the revealed preference as in the case of the private goods. 
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The typical ways to estimate the damage function are evaluation of direct costs, asking people 
about willingness to pay, voting, a study of individual responses to environmental deterioration, and a study 
of market responses and so forth. The evaluation of direct costs is to calculate expenditures on medical care 
and the wage income loss. This method is not popular from the theoretical viewpoint. The way to ask 
people about their willingness to pay is used often to estimate damage function. The problem in this 
method is that there is the possibility of distorted answer when people have incentives to do so. Voting is 
used to get information on the opinion of people about environmental quality, but it is not an appropriate 
method to get information on the damage function. A study of individual responses to environmental 
deterioration is used when the relationship between the environmental quality and the private good is a 
perfect substitute. A study of market responses can be used when the individual responses to the change in 
the environmental quality cause the change in the market price. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to suggest the model structure to resolve disputes on the phosphorus 
problem in the Illinois River Basin. The main issue is how to reflect the characteristics of the problem in 
the model theoretically and practically. The phosphorus problem in the Illinois River Basin can be viewed 
by three different approaches as follows. 
First, the unidirectional externalities approach with side-payment may be considered. There is no 
practical evidence that this approach has been considered. But theoretically this is one of the typical ways 
to deal with a river pollution problem. Especially, side-payment is a device for the downstream region to 
control the pollution discharged from the upstream region. The basic assumption of this approach is that the 
upstream region is unique polluter and the downstream region is unique victim. Thus, the polluter pays 
principle 17 is an important issue of this approach. There are some issues to be examined as TMDL is 
introduced. The first one is whether the assumption of this approach is appropriate. This is because the sub-
regions could be victims as well as polluters if the pollution is not unidirectional. The second one is 
whether its solution captures benefits and costs correctly. This is because umevealed benefits can be 
accrued in the upstream region with a same reason. If the results of the analysis support these ideas, we will 
be able to understand the reason why this approach has not been considered. 
17 The polluter pays principle (PPP) was adopted by the OECD in 1972 as a guideline for domestic environmental 
policies. The reasons for adopting PPP are as follows. Any subsidized pollution abatement can be biased incentives and 
cause distortions in the domestic economy. Second, considering the long run technical development, companies can be 
rewarded by developing better and less expensive abatement technologies. Third, the application of PPP would not 
create unintended distortions in foreign trade. That is, the exporter would have to absorb the total social cost for the 
product (Maler, 1990). 
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Second, the enforcement rule approach may be considered. The US Supreme Court decision 18 in 
1992 is practical evidence that this approach was considered. This approach is same as the first approach 
without side-payment. They are based on the same theoretical assumption of unidirectional externality. 
There are some questions to be investigated with a same reason as above. The first one is whether its 
assumption is appropriate as in the first approach. The second one is whether its solution captures benefits 
and costs correctly. This is also same as in the first approach. Third one is whether the guideline of 
enforced abatement can be acceptable to AR. If the results of analysis support these ideas, we will be able 
to understand the reason why this approach could not be effective. 
Third, the negotiation approach may be considered. But this approach has never been examined to 
resolve the problem in the Illinois River Basin. This approach is based on the assumption of reciprocal 
extemality. It means that all players can be victims as well as polluters at the same time. This assumption is 
compatible with a change in situation and policy due to the introduction of TMDL. The previous 
literatures 19 proved that this approach satisfies the individual rationality and group rationality. Also, it is 
told that this approach provides all players with incentives to participate in the coalition for the negotiation 
when financial transfers are used. One concern in applying this approach to the Illinois River Basin is the 
availability of required data. But it is an issue related to numerical application which will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
These three approaches are considered as option-I, opton-2 and option-3 respectively. The 
organization of this chapter is as follows. First part describes each option. Second part investigates option-3 
to see whether the negotiation approach provides incentives to all participants (sub-regions of AR and OK). 
Third part examines payoffs obtained from three options. Through these procedures, the priority of options 
to AR and OK may be revealed. But any implications for the sub-regions may not be available. This is 
because specific aspects of transition between optima can be captured by numerical application. This 
18 Tomas S. Soerens, Edward H. Fite, OSRC, Janie Hipp, "Water Quality in the Illinois River: Conflict and 
Cooperation between Oklahoma and Arkansas." Diffuse Pollution Conference Dublin 2003 
19 M. Germain and PH.L. Toint (2000), "An Iterative Process for International Negotiations on Acid Rain in Northern 
Europe Using a General Convex Formulation," Environmental and Resource Economics, 15: 199-216; Kaitala, Maler, 
and Tulkens (1995), "The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International 
Cooperation Among Finland, Russia and Estonia," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97 (2): 325-343. 
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chapter suggests the framework of the model and formulas which will be used for numerical application in 
Chapter V. 
Unidirectional Externalities Approach with Side-payment (option-I) 
Let's begin with the unidirectional externalities approach without side-payment. Region-I and 
region-2 are unique upstream polluter and unique downstream victim respectively. Suppose that region- I 
reduces the pollution. The payoffs are 
Payoff for region-I: NB, = -C(R). 
Payoff for region-2: NB2 = B(R). 
C(R): cost function for region-L 
B(R): benefit function for region-2. 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
If region- I has the initial right to pollute the river, there is no incentive for region- I to reduce its pollution. 
There is no way for region-2 to control pollutions discharged from region- I. Both sides cannot reach an 
agreement in this framework. However, the Coase theorem says that upstream and downstream regions can 
reach an agreement that the upstream region restricts its pollution to E* when some assumptions are 
satisfied. 20 
Now consider unidirectional externalities approach with side-payment (option-I). Assume that 
region-I agrees to the pollution reduction with a side-payment S paid by region-2. Specifically, region-I 
will reduce its pollution by R, if a side-payment s, is paid by region-2. Region-2 will pay S2 if region-1 
reduces the pollution with R2 • The payoffs for region-I and region-2 are written as 
Payoff for region-1: NB, = S - C(R) . 
Payoff for region-2: NB2 = B(R)- S. 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
20 The assumptions are as follows: "(I) Both countries know the abatement cost function and the damage cost function 
in each country, (2) there are no transaction costs, (3) the original distribution of property rights is well defined, (4) the 
pollution of the river can be seen in isolation from other international relations, (5) the change in the distribution of the 
rights between the countries will not change the abatement-cost or the damage-cost functions." Maler (1990), 
"International Environmental Problems." Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 6, No. I, p.84. 
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Let (Rl'S1) denote the offer from region-1. Let (R2 ,S2 ) denote the offer from region-2. The condition for 
an agreement is as follows. Region-I will accept (R2 , S2 ) if the payoff obtained from (R2 ,S2 ) is equal to or 
greater than the payoff from its own offer. Region-2 will accept (R1, s1) if the payoff obtained from (R1 , S1) 
is equal to or greater than the payoff from its own offer. These conditions are written as 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
Best reply is a net benefit maximization problem subject to agreement condition. Net benefit maximization 
problem for region- I is 
Max [ S - C(R)] s.t. B(R)- S '?. B(R2)- S2 • 
If the solution to this problem is R1 = R' , 
Side-payment: S1 =B(R')-B(Rz)+S2 
Best reply: (SPR') if[S-C(R))"?.O; (0,0) otherwise. 
Net benefit maximization problem for region-2 is 
Max [B(R) - S] s.t. S - C(R) '?. S1 - C(R1) • 
If the solution to this problem is Rz = R', 
Best reply: ( S2 , R') if[B(R')- S] "?. O; ( O, O) otherwise. 
The results are as follows. 
Nash non-cooperative equilibrium set: { (R', S) :B(R') "?. S "?. C(R')}. 
Equilibrium payoffs set: {(NBl'NBz):NB1 +NB2 =B(R')-C(R')}. 
With the assumptions of identical bargaining power and cooperation, the results are written as 
Total gains: B(R')-C(R'). 
Payoffs: NB1 = NB2 = i[ B(R')-C(R')] · 
Side-payment: S = _!_[B(R')+ C(R')]. 
2 
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(4.7) 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
Enforcement Rule Approach ( option-2) 
Suppose that region-1 is required to reduce its pollution by R . The payoffs are written as 
Payoff for region-1: NB1 = -C( R) < 0. (4.1) 
Payoff for region-2: NB2 = B(R) > o. (4.2) 
This is same as unidirectional externalities approach without side-payment. 
Negotiation Approach (option-3) 
The situation assumed by this approach is as follows. Consider sub-regions which are indexed by 
i (i = 1, ... , n). These sub-regions belong to region-1 or region-2 indexed by z (z = 1, 2) . These n sub-regions 
join the coalition for the negotiation to reduce pollution. Each sub-region knows its current level of 
emission and cost function. Each member must reduce emission every year by r (ratio to the emission 
level of the previous year). The negotiation is held once a year until Pareto optimum is reached. The model 
structure is as follows. 
Region set: z = {zlz = 1,2}. 
Sub-region set: I={ili=l,-··,n}. /cZ. 
Aggregate total cost function: J; ( E) = C; ( E;) + D; (Q; ( E)) 
E: emission (n x 1). E > 0 
Total abatement cost: C. (E.). C' < O, C"> O . (Assume c2 class convex function). 
I l I I 
Deposition function: Q = AE . 
A = ( aii) : transport coefficient matrix ( n x n) . i, J = 1,- .. , n . 
a .. ;:::: O . i is receiving region. 1· is emitting region. y 
Damage function: D(Q) = 11:Q. D(;::: O, D;";:::: O. (Assume linear function). 
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(4.18) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
Q; = '2>ljEj: deposition (nxl). 
j=I 
1r : value of damage per unit of deposition (1 x n). 
Let's begin with a case that global information is available. Under noncooperation, sub-region i's 
aggregate cost minimization problem is 
~:nJ;(E;)=C;(E;)+D;(Q;(E)) s.t. Q=AE, E;>O. i,J=I,-··,n. (4.22) 
The optimality condition to solve this problem is 
(4.23) 
Under cooperation, sub-regioni 's aggregate cost minimization problem is 
Min J=I,(C;(E;)+D;(Q;(E))) s.t. Q=AE, E;>O. 
E, 0£ 2 , .. ·,E. /=I 
(4.24) 
The optimality condition to solve this problem is 
c;(E)+ :i>j,D;(Q/E))=O i,j=I,-··,n. (4.25) 
j=I 
There is a difference in optimality conditions between noncooperation and cooperation. Additional term 
under cooperation is I,ajp;(Q/E)), J '* i. This implies a sub-region is required to reduce greater emission 
j=I 
under cooperation. This is an important property to bring more benefits under cooperation. 
Now suppose that only local information is available. Assume that each sub-region i knows its 
current emission level, marginal abatement cost and marginal damage cost. It is more realistic situation, 
because total aggregate cost function J may not be known to sub-regions in usual cases. With discrete time 
scale, the constraints are rewritten as 
Q, = AE,, E; > F;,, . t : stage of the negotiation. (4.26) 
Assume that emission is lower-bounded due to technological limit. Information about emission level and its 
lower bound is updated at each stage of the negotiation. These assumptions are written as 
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F;,r+i =min[F;,,,,E;.,+il (0:<:;;,;,,+i :<,;,, 0<,:<:;;l)· 
The emission converges to the Pareto optimal level iflevel set of cost is upper-bounded as21 
L0 = {E: l(E) :<,; 1( i) and E; feasible (i = 1, ... ,n)}; lim ~ D. (Q. (E)) = oo · 
IIE11-->00 -fr ' ' 
(4.27) 
(4.28) 
(4.29) 
The initial level of emission E is assumed as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. As emission level 
changes from an initial level to Pareto optimum, aggregate cost also changes. Difference in aggregate cost 
during the transition of emission level from a noncooperative Nash equilibrium to Pareto optimum is 
.E : initial level of emission (noncooperative Nash equilibrium). 
E': Pareto optimum. 
(4.30) 
If J;(E')<J;(E), sub-region i benefits from the negotiation. The difference J;(E)-J1(E') is called 
ecological surplus. The ecological surplus is not known until the end of the negotiation procedures. To 
make ecological surplus available at the current stage of the negotiation, it should be redefined. Total 
surplus between two consecutive negotiation stages is written as 
M, = 1, -1,+, = I M1., = I [ 1ic1., + w1., J · (4.31) 
i=l i=I 
(4.32) 
/iG. , which is assumed as /iG. :<,; 0 22, is total surplus obtained between two stages of the negotiation. µ µ 
Ecological surplus consists of saved abatement cost and reduced damage. This is a source of the financial 
transfers. 
Now consider the financial transfer T . T is received by i ifit is negative. T is paid by i ifit is 
l,t l,t l,t 
positive. The financial transfer is defined as 
21 see Appendix A. 
22 see Appendix B 
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6.T =-6.C. -W. +"'t5.6.G. (O:s;t5;,:;;l,~t5 .. =l, VJ·). 
1,t l,l l,t L.... y J,t "' L.... y 
j }~ 
The budget of transfers is balanced at each stage (feasibility condition). 
n L 6.'f;,, = 0, Vt. 
i=I 
Aggregate cost with financial transfer for sub-region i is 
Aggregate cost decreases as the negotiation proceeds as follows. 
Al; = 6.Ci + wi + 6.T; = I t5ij6.G1., :,; o 
J=l 
&. : surplus sharing rule. 
y 
(4.33) 
(4.34) 
(4.35) 
(4.36) 
(4.37) 
From these results, l;(E')-J; (i), 7; (E'), and Jr (E')-1r (i) can be calculated for sub-region 
and region z (z=l,2; i=l,··,n). 
Payoffs 
Now the task is to formulate net benefits obtained from each option. Let's begin with option-I. 
Suppose that pollution abatement is R' = E - E' . The payoff from option- I is as follows. 
NB1 = S-C(R') 
NB2 =B(R')-S 
S = _!_[B(R') + C(R')] 
2 
Option- I considers only benefit ( of region-2) obtained from reduced damage, side-payment and abatement 
cost ( accrued to region- I). Even if region-I's benefit obtained from the reduced damage existed, it is 
omitted. Such a result is due to the assumption of this approach. Suppose there is the omitted benefit of 
region-I denoted by B1 (R'). B1 (R') was not conceived when option-I was applied. Thus, B1 (R') is the 
extra benefit to region-I. On the other hand, B1 (R') was not conceived when side-payment S was paid by 
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region-2. Thus, B1 (R*) is the extra cost to region-2. To resolve this problem, the payoffs can be reevaluated 
as 
NB;= NB1 + B1(R*) = (S-C(R*))+(D/E)-D1(E*)) 
=S-C(R*)+ L D;(E)- L D;(E*) 
ie{z=l} ie{==l} 
NB~= NB2 -B1(R*) =(Bz<R*)-S)-(D1(E)-D1(E*)) 
= Bz(R*)-S- L D;(E)+ L D;(E*) 
ie{z=l} ie{z=l} 
B1(R*) = (D1 (£)- D1 (E')) 
D1(E)= L D;(E) 
ie{z=l} 
Di(E')= L D;(E') 
ie{z=l} 
Option-2 has same problem. The payoffs from option-2 are as follows. 
With the same reason, the payoffs from option-2 are reevaluated as 
Now consider payoffs obtained from option-3. The payoff for region z is as follows. 
NB== L [(D;(E)-D;(E'))-( C;(E;')-C;(E;) )] 
ie{z) 
= L [( C;(E;)+D;(E) )-( C;(E;)+ D;(E*))] 
ie{=) 
= :t(J;(E)-J;(E')). z=l,2. 
iez 
The financial transfer for sub-region i is defined as 
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(4.38) 
(4.39) 
(4.40) 
(4.41) 
(4.42) 
(4.43) 
s : required number of negotiation stages until the Pareto optimum is reached. 
The financial transfer for region z is defined as 
T =f,"~1: =f,"(-~c. -/ill. +"o .. ~G. ), z=l,2. i,J=l,-··,n. 
:; L,. L,. ,,t L,. L,. l,t ,.1 L..J U J,t 
t=l ie-::; t=l ie{:;} j 
The net benefits including financial transfers are written as 
NB;= L(J;(E)-J;(E*)+T;), z=l,2. 
ie{z) 
The payoffs for region z are summarized as follows. 
Option-I 
Option-2 
Region-I: 
NB;= (s-C(R*))+(D1(E)-D1(E*)) 
=S-C(R*)+ L D;(E)- L D;(E*) 
ie{z=I} ie{z=I} 
Region-2: 
NB~ =(B(R*)-S)-(D1(E)-D1(E*)) 
=B2(R*)-S- L D;(E)+ L D;(E*) 
ie{z=I} ie{z=I} 
Region-I: 
NB1"= -C(R*)+ (D1(E)-D1(E*)) 
=-C(R*)+ L D;(E)- L D;(E*) 
ie{z=I} ie{z=I} 
Region-2: 
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(4.44) 
(4.45) 
(4.46) 
(4.47) 
(4.48) 
(4.49) 
Option-3 (without financial transfers) 
Region-I: 
NB; = I ( J;(E)-J;(E')) 
ie{z=I} 
(4.50) 
Region-2: 
NB;= I (J;(E)-J;(E')) 
ie{z=2} 
( 4.51) 
Option-3 (with financial transfers) 
Region-I: 
NBr = I (J;(E)-J;(E')+:Z:) 
ie{z=l} 
(4.52) 
Region-2: 
NB!= I (J;(E)-J;(E')+I;) 
ie{z=2} 
(4.53) 
The preliminary conclusion is as follows. Regon-1 prefers option-I and region-2 prefers option-2. 
After reevaluating payoffs from option-I, it shows that the net benefit for region-I is underestimated and 
the net benefit for region-2 is overestimated. After reevaluating payoffs from option-2, it shows that the net 
benefit for region-1 is underestimated. 
The payoff from option-3 is still unobvious. This is because the comparison is possible only with 
specific information on the evolutions of emissions and costs. In addition, specific information on the 
distribution of ecological surplus ( or financial transfer) has a key to determine the incentives for the sub-
regions (participants). Thus, the more interesting conclusions can be obtained from the results of numerical 
application in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTERV 
NUMERICAL APPLICATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide specific results using model structure and formula 
developed in Chapter IV. This chapter also gives explanations about the status of data and data construction. 
The reason is that the data problem was a big hurdle to the topic of this dissertation. The data problem 
implies that most required data are not available. The only way to overcome this barrier was to construct 
required data from other available data. The purpose of numerical application in this chapter is not to use 
the result as it is to the real world. It is a device to see how the model is working and how different results 
are obtained from different options. What the result of numerical application represents is only tendency 
revealed by each option. In this context, there is no problem in numerical application using constructed data. 
Although data do not have practical purpose, it may be desirable to construct data based on the feasible 
logic and assumptions. The specific process to construct data is explained in Appendix C. Program writing 
for numerical application was tried using Gauss, Garns, and VBA. Among them, VBA was selected based 
on accessibility and compatibility. Information obtained from program writing procedure is added to this 
chapter. 
The regional selection for numerical application is limited by the data status. The selected sub-
regions cover Rogers (AR), Springdale (AR), Siloam Spring (AR) and Tahlequah (OK). These four sub-
regions are not sufficient to represent the entire feature of the Illinois River Basin. But these sub-regions 
are sufficient to show all possible results of the model. Numerical application is focused on showing the 
results and comparing options. 
This chapter consists of two parts. First part describes the status of data, software and data 
construction procedures. Second part explains the results of numerical application. Numerical application is 
organized by five sub-parts. First one is transition of emissions. This one shows how emission level evolves 
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from a noncooperative Nash equilibrium to Pareto optimum. It also presents the number of the negotiation 
stages required to reach Pareto optimum. Second one is ecological surplus. This is to show the feature of 
saved aggregate costs (in sub-regions of AR and OK) during the transition of emission level between 
optima. Third one is financial transfers. This is to illustrate how to share ecological surplus between 
members (sub-regions of AR and OK) of a coalition for the negotiation. Fourth one is surplus sharing. This 
is to demonstrate how surplus sharing leads all participants (sub-regions of AR and OK) to net gains and 
how it provides participants with incentives to join a coalition for the negotiation. Fifth one is payoffs. This 
is to show net benefits accrued to AR and OK which are obtained from each option. In addition, it explains 
why traditional approach should be ineffective and why the negotiation approach can be a candidate to 
resolve the disputes in the Illinois River Basin. 
Data 
The required data include phosphorus emissions, cost functions, transport coefficients; and 
marginal damage. Initial plan was to cover a wide range of sub-regions including the fifteen watersheds of 
the Upper Illinois River Basin. However, it should be narrowed by the data availability. 
First, transport coefficient data are not available. It should be constructed from other available data. 
The useful relevant data was provided by Gade (Dissertation, 1998). From this data, the transport 
coefficients matrix was constructed for thirteen sub-regions, which include Prairie Grove (AR), Rogers 
(AR), Fayetteville (AR), Springdale (AR), Lincoln (AR), Gentry (AR), Siloam Springs (AR), Watts (OK), 
Westville (OK), Midwestern Nursery (OK), Tahlequah (OK), Cherokee Nation (OK), and Tenkiller (OK). 
The procedure to construct transport coefficient data is explained as in Appendix C. 
Second, phosphorus emission data are available, but only some of them. Annual data is rarely 
found. Most useful data are offered by Water Quality Monitoring Report.23 This source covers eight sub-
regions such as Ark04 (Flint Creek), Ark05 (Sager Creek), Ark06 (Illinois River), Ark07 (Baron Fork), 
Rogers (AR), Springdale (AR), Illinois River near Watts (OK), Illinois River Near Tahlequah (OK), Flint 
Creek Near Kansas (OK), and Baron Fork at Eldon (OK) for 1980-2002. Other data sources such as USGS, 
23 Arkansas-Oklahoma Compact, "Water Quality Monitoring Report- Illinois River Basin," CY2002. 
44 
STORET, EPA, DEQ (AR, OK) are available. But these data sources do not provide annual data. It is 
required to calculate annual data using raw data (daily/monthly data; stream flow; phosphorus load etc.). 
The problem in using raw data is missing of data for long period of time. Another data source may be 
simulated data. Storm et al. ( 1996) provides simulated annual data. It covers the fifteen watersheds of the 
Upper Illinois River Basin for 1960-1980's. There is another useful source of data. Nelson and White (2002) 
offer phosphorus annual data for Rogers (AR) and Springdale (AR) for 1997-2001. From these data sources, 
data for ten sub-regions, which include six sub-regions in AR and 4 sub-regions in OK, are collected. 
Third, the abatement cost data are not available. Some valuable data could be found from Willett 
and Mitchell (2001). Rogers (AR), Fayetteville (AR), Springdale (AR), Siloam Springs (AR), and 
Tahlequah (OK) are covered by this data source. The data provides cost data as a functional form of 
ci (Xi)= r,q0 +mix - wi2 x 2 + w; X 3 in which X denotes a percentage of phosphorus reduction and w denotes 
coefficients. The function Ci (Xi) has been converted into a function of emissions Ci (Ei) through a 
procedure using quadratic approximation technique and econometric method. First step is to define the cost 
function as 
Using the definition of X, 
The function Ci (Xi) can be rewritten as 
C(E) =- ~, + 2m (1- !i )1--3m (1- !i )2 1--
11 E 2 EE 3 EE 
p p p p p 
If the cost function Ci (E;) is evaluated at Ei by quadratic approximation technique, it will be written as 
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The function C; (E;) can be rewritten as 
C;(E;)=r; +a;(E; -E;)+ /J;(E; -£;)2 
Y; =C;(E;) 
The parameter Y; is total abatement cost at E; = E; . a; is marginal abatement cost. /J; is a coefficient of 
squared error at the level of emission E; . Second step is to find the value of Y; , a; and /J; . The values of 
Y; and a; are obtained using econometric method. The value of /J; can be estimated using these values. 
From these procedures, the obtained cost function data covers three sub-regions of AR and one sub-region 
ofOK. 
Fourth, marginal damage data are not available. The way to get this data was based on the 
assumption that 1997 is a year characterized as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. The reason is that the 
state of AR and OK agreed to the reduction of total phosphorus loading in 1997 as explained in Chapter I 
(Introduction). Under the Nash equilibrium assumption, the marginal damage ,r is observable from the 
relationship that -c;(Ei)=1r;D;(Q) (Chapter IV, Negotiation). The marginal damage data for Rogers (AR), 
Springdale (AR), and Siloam Springs (AR), and Tahlequah (OK) became available from such a process. 
The data availability made by data construction is summarized as follows: Transport coefficient 
data for thirteen sub-regions; the phosphorus emission data for ten sub-regions; the abatement cost and 
marginal damage data for four sub-regions. Finally the data sets for four sub-regions of AR and one sub-
region of OK could be used for numerical application. This range of sub-regions includes Rogers (AR), 
Springdale (AR}, Siloam Springs (AR), and Tahlequah (OK) which are indexed by subscript i (i = 1,2,3,4). 
Software 
The required function of software is nonlinear optimization. There are many qualified software 
such as Gauss, Garns, FORTRAN, Mathematica, AIMMS, Matlab, SAS, VBA and so forth. Gauss has 
46 
packages which use Newton/Quasi-Newton method. Garns has nonlinear programming (NLP) solvers such 
as MINOS, CONOPT and SNOPT. Among them, SNOPT uses nonlinear function and gradient values. 
SNOPT is said to be effective when the problem has a nonlinear objective function and large numbers of 
sparse linear constraints. MINOS is known as more efficient than SNOPT if the objective and its gradients 
are cheap to evaluate. FORTRAN has a package of LANCELOT which uses Trust-Region method. The 
LANCELOT package is based on FORTRAN77. Other software (SAS, AIMMS and Mathematica) also 
have Trust-Region method packages. Those solvers or packages are said to use mathematical techniques 
such as descent methods, conjugate gradient methods, Newton-type methods and so forth. This study uses 
VBA. The strength of this software is flexibility and compatibility with excel software. 
Numerical Application 
The assumed situation is as follows. Three sub-regions (i = 1, 2,3) of AR and one sub-region (i = 4) 
of OK agree to form a coalition for the negotiation to reduce phosphorus emissions in the Illinois River 
Basin. Each sub-region (SR-i, i = 1,2,3,4) reduces phosphorus emission by 5% to the level of previous year. 
Each member ( SR - i ) knows its marginal abatement cost and marginal damage cost at any level of 
phosphorus emission. 1997 is chosen as an initial state and characterized as a noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium. The reason is same as explained in Chapter I (Introduction) and Chapter V (Data). The 
negotiation is terminated at the stage which all sub-regions reach Pareto optimum. 
The total cost function of SR-i is 
J;(E)= C;(E;)+D1 (Q;(E)) 
C; ( E;) = Y; + a; ( E; - E;) + P; ( E1 - E1 r 
D(Q)= nQ 
Q=AE 
The initial values of parameters and emissions are as follows. 
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Table 5.1 P Emissions and Parameters 
i E; r a /3 :rr (ton/Yr) (million dollars) (dollar/ Kg) (dollar/ton') (dollar I Kg) 
i = I 26.8 3.9 47.3 8.4 52.12 
i = 2 55.0 6.9 47.3 7.9 52.65 
i=3 94.5 2.0 4.4 0.2 5.86 
i=4 49.8 2.0 2.3 0.0 74.62 
a e T bl 5 2 T ransport oe 1c1ents C ffi . 
i = I i = 2 i=3 i = 4 
j = l 0.908 0.093 0.000 0.000 
}=2 0.083 0.898 0.000 0.000 
j=3 0.000 0.000 0.753 0.000 
}=4 0.072 0.080 0.194 0.031 
i : Emitting sub-region. j: Receiving sub-region. 
Transition of Emission 
The first task is to examine the Pareto optimal level of emission of SR - i . If SR - i reaches the 
Pareto optimum, it does not need to reduce emission any more. The evolution of emissions during the 
transition from a noncooperative Nash equilibrium to Pareto optimum is as follows. 
Table 5.3 Evolution of P Emission (tonNr) 
SR-1 SR-2 SR-3 SR-4 
0 27 55 95 50 
1 26 54 90 50 
2 26 54 85 50 
3 26 54 81 50 
4 26 54 77 50 
5 26 54 73 50 
6 26 54 69 50 
7 26 54 66 50 
8 26 54 63 50 
9 26 54 60 50 
10 26 54 57 50 
11 26 54 54 50 
12 26 54 51 50 
13 26 54 49 50 
14 26 54 48 50 
15 26 54 48 50 
16 26 54 48 50 
17 26 54 48 50 
18 26 54 48 50 
19 26 54 48 50 
20 26 54 48 50 
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Table 5 .3 and Figure 5 .1 show the evolution of phosphorus emissions. SR -1 and SR - 2 reach the optimum 
at the first stage. SR - 3 reaches the optimum at the fourteenth stage. SR- 4 does not need to reduce its 
phosphorus emission. The negotiation is terminated at the fourteenth stage. 
SR - 3 is required to reduce greater emission than other sub-regions. The reason is that its effect of 
emission on other region is greater. SR - 4 is not required to reduce its emission additionally. This is 
because it does not affect other region. SR -1 and SR - 2 are required to reduce their emissions, but they are 
small since their effects on other region is small. 
Ecological Surplus 
Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of aggregate cost during the transition from a noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium to Pareto optimum. The cost of SR-3 increases remarkably. The cost SR-4 decreases 
considerably. The costs of SR-1 decreases slightly. The cost of SR-2 increases slightly. 
Cost reductions consist of saved abatement costs and reduced damage costs. In SR - 4, the reduced 
damage cost is greater than other regions. In SR - 3 case, increased abatement cost dominates the reduced 
damage cost. In SR -1 and SR - 2, the evolution of costs are also obtained from changes in damage costs 
and abatement costs. The saved aggregate cost is ecological surplus as defined in Chapter IV. Thus, 
ecological surplus occurs in SR -1 and SR - 4 . 
Financial Transfers 
Figure 5 .3 shows the evolution of transfers. The financial transfer is received if it is negative and 
paid ifit is positive as explained in Chapter IV (Negotiation approach). SR-4 is a biggest payer and SR-3 
is a biggest recipient of the financial transfer. SR -1 and SR - 2 are also recipients of the financial transfer. 
This result implies that the ecological surplus can be shared between sub-regions using financial transfers. 
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Surplus Sharing 
Table 5.4 shows cost reductions when financial transfers are used or not. As shown in (1), 
aggregate costs increase in SR - 2 and SR - 3 . Aggregate costs decrease in SR -1 and SR - 4 . These results 
are obtained from changes in abatement cost and damage cost as explained in Figure 5.2. 
Financial transfers are as (2) in the Table 5.4. The allocated amount of the financial transfer is 
determined by surplus sharing rule 8 .. as explained in Chapter IV (Negotiation approach). The total amount 
y 
of financial transfers is zero. This implies that the budget of transfers is balanced at each stage (feasibility 
condition), i.e. :t~i;,, = o, Vt. 
i=l 
Aggregate costs with financial transfers are as shown in (3) in Table 5.4. Comparing with (1), 
aggregate cost decreases in all sub-regions. This is a result of surplus sharing using financial transfers. 
Based on this result, we can say that the negotiation approach with financial transfers leads all players to 
aggregate cost reduction. In other words, the negotiation approach provides all members with incentives to 
participate in a coalition for the negotiation to reduce emissions when financial transfers are used. 
Table 5.4 Costs Reduction Without/With Transfers (m.$) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
...................... ____ .......................... _, ____ .. 
................... --........... .. ........................................ ___ ............ -........ 
····-·--··---.. ················-----........................ 
(l;(E')-J;(E)) J;(E') J;(E')-J;(E) ( J; (E')-J; (£)) 
l;\E) 
SR-I -0.5 -2.1 -2.6 -0.17% 
SR-2 1.2 -4.4 -3.2 -0.12% 
SR-3 338.5 -406.4 -67.9 -534.87% 
SR-4 -684.2 413.0 -271.3 -11.44% 
Total -345.0 0.0 -345.0 -5.20% 
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Payoffs 
This section examines the payoffs of jurisdictional regions indexed by z (z = 1,2) in Chapter IV. 
The payoff obtained from each option is as shown in Table 5.5. The payoff from option-I is NB in which 
AR and OK share benefits equally. But this result is distorted as explained in Chapter IV (Payoffs). The 
reevaluated payoff is NB' which show net gain to AR and net loss to OK. This result says that option-I is 
acceptable to AR, option-I is not acceptable to OK. Thus, both sides may not reach an agreement. 
The payoff from option-2 is NB which shows net loss to AR and net gain to OK. This result is 
also distorted by missing extra benefit of AR. The reevaluated payoff is NB". Net loss to AR becomes 
lower than before reevaluation. Option-2 is not acceptable to AR, but option-2 is acceptable to OK. Thus, 
both sides may not reach an agreement. 
The payoffs from option-3 are NB* and NBr . NB' is payoffs from option-3 when financial 
transfers are not used. The result shows net loss to AR and net gain to OK. Thus, both sides may not reach 
an agreement when option-3 is used without financial transfers. 
NBr is payoffs from option-3 when financial transfers are used. The result shows net gain to AR 
and OK. Both sides may be able to reach an agreement, because incentives for both sides exist. Based on 
this result, the negotiation approach with financial transfers can be best strategy to AR and OK. 
Table 5.5 Net Benefits 
AR OK Notes 
NB 36.5 36.5 Eq.(4.16) 
Option-1 
NB' 308.2 -235.5 Eq.(4.46), (4.47) 
NB -647.7 684.2 Eq.(4.1), (4.2) 
Option-2 
NB" -375.7 684.2 Eq.(4.48), (4.49) 
NB' -339.2 684.2 Eq.(4.50), (4.51) 
Option-3 
NBT 73.8 271.3 Eq.( 4.52),( 4.53) 
NB : Net benefits based on unidirectional externalities approach. 
NB' , NB" : Net benefits adjusted to reflect the extra benefits. 
NB': Net benefits obtained during the transition between equilibria. 
NBr: Net benefits when the financial transfers are used. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Discussions are summarized as follows. The phosphorus problem in the Illinois River basin has 
been regarded as a river pollution problem. Initial efforts to resolve the problem have been made based on 
the assumption of unidirectional externalities approach. The traditional approaches become incompatible 
with the property of the problem in the Illinois River Basin as the target of abatement has shifted from point 
source to nonpoint source pollutions. Such a situation is requiring new approach. This is a motivation of the 
dissertation. To investigate the problem, three options are considered. First option is the unidirectional 
externalities approach with side-payment. Second option is the enforcement rule approach. Third option is 
the negotiation approach. These three options are analyzed and compared by designated model and 
numerical application. Required data should be constructed, because they are not readymade. Mathematical 
logics, plausible assumptions and other available data were used in constructing data. The regional 
selection for numerical application was limited by the status of data. Finally, three sub-regions of AR and 
one sub-region of OK could be used. These four sub-regions data successfully show all possible results. 
Numerical application supports that the negotiation approach is a best strategy to AR and OK. 
Implications for data are as follows. First, it is imminent to improve the data collection system. 
Current system is not friendly supporting economic research. Data for phosphorus emissions, phosphorus 
abatement costs, transport coefficients and damage costs are required to apply the negotiation to the Illinois 
River Basin. Second, the data for all relevant watersheds of the Illinois River Basin are required. Third, the 
data need to be developed so as to capture not only point source, but also nonpoint source discharge of 
phosphorus. Fourth, standardized abatement cost data should be developed to cover various sources of 
phosphorus. The improvement of data system will be a first priority to resolve the phosphorus problem in 
the Illinois River Basin (Appendix C; Chapter V). 
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Implications for approaches are as follows. First, traditional approaches are ineffective. These 
approaches cannot lead AR and OK to an agreement. Second, the negotiation approach provides all 
participants (sub-regions) with incentives to join a coalition for the negotiation. Third, the negotiation is 
unique approach to guarantee an agreement between AR and OK. Fourth, the negotiation approach is most 
persuasive resolution. It offers specific outlook such as required periods for negotiation, expected payoffs 
and the features of surplus sharing (Appendix E). 
New findings are as follows. First, it identified that ineffectiveness of traditional approaches is due 
to an impractical assumption. Second, it demonstrated the possibility that the negotiation approach could be 
applied successfully to the phosphorus problem in the Illinois River Basin. Third, it found the fact that the 
lack of data is a barrier to apply the negotiation to the Illinois River Basin. Fourth, it found that the 
multilateral negotiation between all relevant sub-tegions is more desirable than the bilateral negotiation 
between AR and OK. As far as the dispute is viewed as a problem between AR and OK, the problem may 
not be resolved. The reason is that such a viewpoint is to adopt unidirectional externalities assumption. 
Fifth, in resolving the problem in the Illinois River Basin, each approach is distinguished as follows. Under 
the enforcement rule, the negotiation is not possible. Under the unidirectional externalities approach with 
side-payment, negotiation is possible, but an agreement is not possible. Under the negotiation approach, 
both negotiations and an agreement are possible. Thus, the negotiation approach is the most practical way 
to resolve the jurisdictional disputes on water quality between Arkansas and Oklahoma in the Illinois River 
Basin. 
The limit of this study is as follows. First, the constructed data are biased to point source. It was 
inevitable because of the lack of data. But it should be improved in the future. Second, there are 
accompanied issues such as information reliability and free riders. Although they are important issues, they 
could not be included. Third, a wide range of sub-regions could not be covered. Even though this is also 
due to the lack of data, it should be improved to produce more practical results. 
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APPENDIX A: CONVERGENCE PROPERTY OF SOLUTION 
Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1996) proved the convergence property of solution as follows. 
(A.1) Q=Q(E)=AE. 
(A.4) E; ~o. 
(A.6) Q, =Q(E,)=AE, 
(A.7) F;,, ~ F; 
(A.9) Q~'l"i,t+I ~'l" 
(A.10) L0 ={EjJ(E)~J(E) and E; feasible (i=l, ... ,n)} 
(A.11) lim ~ D.(Q.(E))=oo 
IIEJl-->00 -fi' 1 1 
Theorem: 
(i) Under the conditions stated above, the sequence { E,} converges to a solution of optimization 
problem in (A.3)-(A.1 )-(A.4). 
(ii) Furthermore, this convergence occurs in a number of stages if all limiting values of the 
emissions are strictly positive. 
Proof: 
(i) The sequence { E,} converges to a solution of (A.3)-(A.1)-(A.4) 
Consider the case where the sequence { E,} is infinite. 
The boundedness of the level set L0 and its definition in (A.10) ensure that it is compact. 
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Using (A.9), extract a subsequence {tj (=i ~ {t}:1 such that {E,J~=1 and { ,i.J~=1 (i = I,· ·,n) are convergent, 
with 
hmE, = E and l_im ,, = r, (i = 1,-··,n). 
J---'t-00 J )400 I I 
(A.12) 
If/~ {l,· ··,n} is defined as the set of indices such that Ei,, = F;,1-1 for infinitely many tj, this set must 
contain least one element, otherwise the procedure will stop and the convergence will be finite. 
Deduce that, for each i E / , 
where (A.8) is used. But :i:; ::;;,i,t+I < 1 by (A.9), and thus (A.4) and (A.13) imply that 
(A.13) 
(A.14) 
If the first order optimality conditions for the local problems (A.3)-(A.1)-(A.4) at each stage, the result is 
obtained as 
aJ ( EJ {~ 0 ~f Ei,,1 = F;,,ri 
BE. -0 If E., >F, 1 I J,J 1•)-
In the limit, what is deduced from (A.15) and the definition of I is 
aJ ( E) - {~ 0 i e / 
--=VJ(E). 
BE. ' =0 i~I I 
Now let E' denote a solution of global problem (A.3)-(A.1 )-(A.4), which obviously ensures that 
J(E) ~ J(E'). 
If J(E) > J(E'), then 
O>J(E')-J(E) ~VJ(E)7 (E' -£) 
= Lief VJ(E};(E/-£;} 
= Lief VJ(E)l/ ~ O 
where the convexity of J(-), (A.16) and (A.14) are successfully used. But (A.17) is impossible. 
Thus, J(E') = J(E) is obtained as desired. 
If the sequence {E} is finite, E. = E. = E. for some t and for all i. 
t 1,t+I 1,t I 
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(A.15) 
(A.16) 
(A.17) 
(A.18) 
And the solution of the local program (A.3)-(A.l)-(A.7) is not constrained by any of the bounds (A.7): 
therefore, it is also solution of the global program. 
(ii) The convergence occurs in a number of stages if all limiting values of the emissions are 
strictly positive. 
Assume that the sequence {E,} is infinite. As in the first part of the proof, it is obtained that (A.14) is 
satisfied for some non-empty set I, which is impossible if all limiting values of the emissions are strictly 
positive. Thus, this latter condition implies that the sequence {E,} is finite and the theorem is proved. 
QED 
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APPENDIX B: PROPERTY OF SURPLUS 
Germain et al. (1996) proved the property of surplus as follows. 
Theorem: At each stage t of the negotiation process and for all regions, it must be that t,,.G. s o . 
],I 
Proof: 
For stage t, Consider the functions 
Gj (Ej) = C1 (Ej )+Ej:taif:ri (B.1) 
i=l 
This definition implies that 
(B.2) 
The convexity of G. in E. yields that 
J } 
(B.3) 
Taking derivative of(B.1), 
G; ( Ej) = c; ( Ej) + :t aij:ri (B.4) 
i=I 
(i) If Ej,t+I s Ej,t, c; ( Ej,t+I) = c;,, ( Ej,t+I) + :t aij:ri ;::: 0 (B.5) 
i=1 
(ii) If Ej,t < Ej,t+I' c; ( Ej,t+I) = c;,, ( Ej,t+I) + :t aij:ri = 0 (B.6) 
i=l 
:. 11G = 0 J,t 
QED 
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APPENDIX C: DATA CONSTRUCTION 
Phosphorus Emission Data Sources: 
Water Quality Monitoring Report- Illinois River Basin (CY2002, Arkansas-Oklahoma Compact) 
provides P emission data for the period of 1980-2002. The data cover ARK04A, ARK.05, ARK.07, Watts, 
Tahlequah, Kansas and Eldon. Data from Water-Resources Investigations Report (USGS) cover 
phosphorus concentrations, loads, and yields in the Illinois River Basin. The data cover five regions 
including Illinois River near Watts, Flint Creek near Kansas, Illinois River at Chewey, Illinois River near 
Tahlequah, and Baron Fork at Eldon. Other data sources are EPA, USGS, STORET and DEQ (OK, AR) etc. 
These sources provide similar data. The concentration of phosphorus data is provided. The data are 
collected once a month. To get annual data, it should be calculated from stream water and phosphorus data. 
But these data are missing for long period of time in many cases. Marc Nelson and Kati White (2002) 
provide Illinois River Phosphorus Mass Balance inputs data. Storm et al. (1996) provides basin-wide 
pollution inventory data for the Illinois River Basin. These data are simulated by independent and 
continuous simulation techniques. The data cover fifteen watersheds in the Upper Illinois River Basin for 
the period of 1962-1986. 
Transport coefficients, Cost and Other Data Sources: 
Gade (Dissertation, 1998) examines the transport of nonpoint source nutrients in the Illinois River 
Basin in Oklahoma and Arkansas. This study clarifies the main sources of phosphorus discharge and 
transport mechanism. Storm et al. (2003) is dealing with evaluating cost effective technologies to reduce 
phosphorus for the Ozark region using SWAT model. Mizgalewicz (Dissertation, 1996) sets up the model 
of agrichemical transport in Midwest River using GIS technique. This study describes the mathematical 
logic and how to operate the SWAT model in detail. It provides specific results about cost effectiveness 
and optimal policy for phosphorus abatement. 
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Table A.1 P Loading in the Arkansas Region 
(I) Ark04 - Flint Creek (2) Ark05 - Sager Creek (3) Ark06 - Illinois River 
Year Flow Pt Pt Flow Pt Pt Flow Pt Pt 
(cfs) (mg/L) (kg/yr) (cfs) (mg/L) (kg/yr) (cfs) (mg/L) (kg/yr) 
1980 11.90 0.13 1382 4.50 2.43 9766 169.00 0.47 70939 
1981 19.80 0.15 2635 6.50 2.13 12336 197.00 0.42 73895 
1982 29.90 0.17 4566 9.00 2.03 16277 591.00 0.37 195294 
1983 19.00 0.07 1239 6.30 1.96 11050 352.00 0.39 121347 
1984 53.50 0.11 5351 15.40 0.95 13066 706.00 0.44 278693 
1985 91.30 0.06 5137 24.80 1.74 38450 947.00 0.29 244426 
1986 78.40 0.07 4691 21.10 0.83 15716 879.00 0.31 239436 
1987 58.30 0.05 2551 16.70 0.95 14136 815.00 0.29 213996 
1988 41.80 0.03 1157 12.60 1.15 12986 531.00 0.25 119982 
1989 38.00 0.05 1697 11.70 1.23 12821 558.00 0.29 145020 
1990 71.30 0.06 3821 20.20 0.86 15515 1127.00 0.20 205331 
1991 51.60 0.05 2489 15.50 0.91 12653 724.00 0.22 142253 
1992 56.10 0.05 2355 16.50 1.28 18921 760.00 0.22 150684 
1993 88.20 0.05 3545 24.60 0.64 13995 1163.00 0.18 188000 
1994 53.00 0.05 2414 15.70 0.72 10110 674.00 0.19 114370 
1995 61.30 0.08 4106 17.80 0.70 11080 783.00 0.24 165733 
1996 33.50 0.05 1496 11.00 0.92 9028 667.00 0.23 134032 
1997 37.30 0.07 2448 17.80 1.03 16354 497.00 0.21 94504 
1998 42.90 0.06 2142 18.10 0.86 13876 668.00 0.25 146960 
1999 63.50 0.05 2578 24.50 0.98 21429 737.00 0.21 135413 
2000 55.60 0.04 1893 30.70 0.82 22469 597.00 0.23 122831 
2001 39.40 0.05 1636 21.20 0.80 15201 598.00 0.29 156581 
2002 44.60 0.05 1850 21.80 1.19 23231 619.00 0.28 156009 
Avg. 50.00 0.07 3047 19.00 1.18 19816 668.00 0.28 167762 
Source: Arkansas-Oklahoma Compact, "Water Quality Monitoring Report Illinois River Basin," CY2002. 
(4) Ark07 - Baron Fork 
Flow Pt Pt 
(cfs) (mg/L) (kg/vr) 
9.50 0.10 878 
18.40 0.14 2218 
37.40 0.48 16167 
27.20 0.13 3037 
51.80 0.18 8466 
79.40 0.21 14962 
64.00 0.15 8402 
63.20 0.13 7563 
31.80 0.10 2755 
50.20 0.12 5559 
102.00 0.11 9929 
49.40 0.09 3794 
47.90 0.13 5433 
104.00 0.08 7709 
37.00 0.08 2677 
54.20 0.16 7842 
64.40 0.08 4831 
35.90 0.07 2151 
61.10 0.11 5822 
45.80 0.10 4176 
52.60 0.13 6230 
41.40 0.07 2387 
38.00 0.10 3536 
51.00 0.13 6012 
O'I 
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Table A.2 P Loading in the Oklahoma Region 
(5) Illinois River near Watts (6) Illinois River Near (7) Flint Creek Near Kansas Tahlequah Year Flow Pt Pt Flow Pt Pt Flow Pt Pt 
(cfs) (mg/L) (kg/yr) (cfs) (mg/L) (kg/yr) (cfs) (mg/L) (kg/yr) 
1980 173.0 0.42 65279 249.0 - - 32.00 0.19 5454 
1981 260.0 0.19 44119 384.0 - - 57.00 0.18 9077 
1982 591.0 - - 812.0 - - 69.00 0.19 11537 
1983 352.0 - - 537.0 - - 49.00 0.28 12415 
1984 706.0 - - 1157.0 - - 143.00 0.24 30532 
1985 947.0 
- - 1651.0 - - 237.00 0.22 47591 
1986 879.0 
- - 1452.0 - - 183.00 0.22 36430 
1987 815.0 - - 1218.0 - - 141.00 0.16 19840 
1988 531.0 - - 820.0 - - 97.00 0.27 22946 
1989 558.0 0.21 104653 808.0 - - 90.00 0.56 44981 
1990 1127.0 0.18 182432 1695.0 0.10 147579 - 0.11 -
1991 724.0 0.16 104534 1094.0 0.08 76796 - 0.12 -
1992 760.0 0.16 109571 1207.0 0.08 86205 - 0.12 -
1993 1163.0 0.28 287317 1751.0 0.10 154647 182.00 0.16 25359 
1994 674.0 0.17 101127 1071.0 0.08 80223 136.00 0.13 15418 
1995 783.0 0.14 100233 1123.0 0.08 80229 140.00 0.19 23207 
1996 693.0 0.19 116542 938.0 0.09 71207 76.00 0.15 10294 
1997 573.0 0.16 83415 812.0 0.07 49797 94.80 0.12 9871 
1998 713.0 0.14 87876 1044.0 0.08 75524 96.50 0.13 10945 
1999 793.0 0.18 130314 1143.0 0.24 239891 137.00 0.21 25817 
2000 648.0 0.34 197346 1083.0 0.19 185708 133.00 0.16 19243 
2001 649.0 0.39 223154 1033.0 0.19 172521 101.00 0.17 15154 
2002 619.0 0.42 229424 851.0 0.34 256129 82.00 0.21 15452 
Avg. 684.0 0.23 142368 1041.0 0.13 121852 114.00 0.19 19774 
Source: Arkansas-Oklahoma Compact, "Water Quality Monitoring Report Illinois River Basin," CY2002. 
(8) Baron Fork at Eldon 
Flow Pt Pt 
(cfs) (mg/L) (kg/yr) 
77 - -
201 - -
296 - -
184 - -
364 - -
593 - -
536 - -
491 - -
269 - -
320 - -
666 - -
451 0.06 24,145 
440 0.095 37,315 
700 0.108 67,234 
328 0.037 10,878 
422 0.263 98,819 
432 0.025 9,645 
332 0.023 6,671 
409 0.033 12,054 
361 0.042 13,541 
376 0.164 55,072 
343 0.076 23,281 
262 0.203 47,500 
385 0.094 32,305 
Table A. 3 I ' lhnms River Ph h osp orus M Bl ( d/Y) ass a ance mputs ,poun r 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Prairie Grove 349 377 1,237 18,633 503 
Rogers 59,168 76,820 68,632 71,458 76,525 
Springdale 121,185 109,455 124,115 134,270 192,361 
Source: Marc Nelson and Kati White (2002), "Illinois River Phosphorus Sampling 
Results and Mass Balance Computation," University of Arkansas. 
Abatement Cost Functions 
Cost data are available only for Tahlequah (OK), Rogers (AR), Fayetteville (AR), Springdale 
(AR), and Siloam Springs (AR). The available data have a form of ci (X;) = m;° + m;1 x - mii xi + m: X 3 where 
X denotes a percentage of phosphorus reduction and OJ denotes coefficients. 
Table A.4 WWTP Cost Functions 
(1) Tahlequah (OK) TC=l,678,837+19,099.9 X -521.59 xi+4.7015 X 3 
(2) Rogers (AR) TC=2,353,899+25,633.2X -699.2Xi +4.7015 X 3 
(3) Fayetteville (AR) TC =3,894,306+42,942.6 X -1,171.8 xi+ 10.566 X 3 
(4) Springdale (AR) TC=3,630,080+38,081.6X-1,037.7 xi+9.3627 X 3 
(5) Siloam Springs (AR) TC= 1, 154,362+ 10,885 X -294.19 xi+ 2.6763 X 3 
* WWTP: Wastewater Treatment Plant. 
Source: K.D. Willett and D .. M. Mitchell (2001 ), Working paper. 
To use an abatement cost function as a function of emissions, it is necessary to convert the 
function Ci (Xi) into Ci ( Ei) . Suppose that the function is defined as Ci ( Ei ) = yi + ai ( Ei - Ei ) + pi ( Ei - Ei r 
where E; is the emission level of initial state and E; is current level of emission. The problem is to find 
the value of Y; , a; , and p; . 
By the definition of X , 
E. 
X=l--' 
Ep 
The cost function is rewritten as 
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Using quadratic approximation technique, the cost function C;(E;) is evaluated at E; as 
C;(E;) is rewritten as 
The parameter Y; is an abatement cost, and a; is marginal abatement cost, and p; is a coefficient of 
variance at the level of emission E; . If the current level of emission E; is equal to E; , the abatement cost 
will be Y; = C;(E;). 
Table A.5 Abatement Cost and Emissions 
E, C,(£,) £2 Ci(£2) £3 C3 (EJ E4 Ci£4) 
32413 2353899 60905 3630080 122831 1154362 185708 1678837 
31856 2395949 60311 3666215 119998 1177933 172117 1792526 
31298 2434055 59718 3700431 117166 1198572 158526 1861400 
30741 2468410 59124 3732779 114333 1216475 144935 1896514 
30183 2499205 58531 3763313 111500 1231840 131344 1908928 
29626 2526634 57937 3792084 108668 1244863 117753 1909698 
29069 2550889 57344 3819143 105835 1255742 104161 1909883 
28511 2572163 56750 3844544 103002 1264673 90570 1920539 
27954 2590647 56157 3868337 100169 1271854 76979 1952725 
27396 2606534 55563 3890575 97337 1277481 63388 2017497 
26839 2620018 54970 3911310 94504 1281751 49797 2125914 
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Figure A.1 Abatement Cost (SR-1) 
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Figure A.2 Abatement Cost (SR-2) 
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Figure A.3 Abatement Cost (SR-3) 
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Figure A.4 Abatement Cost (SR-4) 
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Table A.6 Parameters and Initial Values 
i{ r a /J 1( i 
(ton/ Yr) (million$) ($/ Kg) (dollar/ton') ($/ton) 
I 27 4 47.3 8.44 52.1 
2 55 7 47.3 7.87 52.6 
3 95 2 4.4 0.15 5.9 
4 50 2 2.3 0.02 74.6 
Transport Coefficients Matrix 24 
Table A.7 Total Phosphorus Transported to the Lake Tenkiller (1991-1993) 
Estimated 
Estimated Corrected Load at Annual Estimated Distance to Total 
Load Horseshoe Horseshoe Bend Load Discharger 
at Source Bend (kg/yr) 
(kg/yr) (km) Low Medium 
Flow Flow High 
(kg/yr) (kg/yr) Flow 
Prairie Grove 1,200 161 19 70 23 70 
Rogers 21,600 159 355 1,290 417 1,290 
Fayetteville 4,500 156 80 284 90 284 
Springdale 43,150 153 820 2,860 893 2,860 
Lincoln 1,200 130 38 115 31 115 
Gentry 1,700 109 85 232 56 232 
Siloam Springs 10,000 100 623 1,610 362 1,610 
Watts 500 100 31 81 18 81 
Westville 2,900 45 615 1,240 187 1,240 
Midwestern 600 23 211 391 49 391 
Tahlequah 4,700 10 2,200 3,910 441 3,910 
Cherokee Nation 530 8 257 455 51 455 
Total 92,600 5,300 12,500 2,620 12,500 
Sources: David R Gade (Dissertation, 1998) 
Transport coefficient matrix is for the Illinois River Basin is not available. The relevant data is 
found from Gade (Dissertation, 1998). These data cover Prairie Grove, Rogers, Fayetteville, Springdale, 
Lincoln, Gentry, Siloam Springs, Watts, Westville, Midwestern Nursery, Tahlequah, Cherokee Nation, and 
Tenkiller. This study provides the estimates of total phosphorus transported to the Lake Tenkiller. 
24 "Rivers and streams are the major routes of transfer of phosphorus to ocean and many lakes. The main source of 
phosphorus includes the mining phosphate and its agricultural, industrial and domestic uses. Other activities such as 
clearing of forests, extensive cultivation and urban waste disposal and drainage systems have enhanced the transport of 
P from terrestrial to aquatic environments." JOHN M. MELACK, "Transport and transformations of P, Pluvial and 
Lacustrine Ecosystems," SCOPE54, PHOSPHORUS IN THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, Edited by Holm Tiessen, 
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), 1995: 245-254. 
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Figure A.5 Direction of Phosphorus Transport 
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Sources: David R Gade (Thesis, 1998), Arkansas-Oklahoma Compact, ''Water Quality Monitoring Report 
Illinois River Basin,'' CY2002. 
The conceptual diagram flow chart describes the direction and the relationship between the upstream and 
the downstream points in the Illinois River Basin stream (Gade, 1998). 
Using these data, the estimated transport coefficients from each region to the ending point (Tenkiller Lake) 
are as follows. 
Table A.8 Trans Jort Coefficient to Tenkiller 
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
p 0.058 0.060 0.063 0.066 0.096 0.136 0.161 0.162 0.428 0.652 0.832 0.858 
The transport coefficients matrix can be derived based some assumptions. Consider the transport 
coefficient between the upstream and the next first downstream region. Let Pn,Pn_1,. •• ,p1 denote the 
transport coefficient from the upstream region to the ending downstream region. The subscription n 
denotes then-th upstream point from the ending point. Let an,an_1,. •• ,a1 denote transport coefficients from 
the upstream region to the next first downstream region. 
First, assume that the downstream regions do not affect the upstream regions. From this 
assumption, the zero values are obtained as transport coefficients from the downstream points to the 
upstream point. 
Second, assume that the transport coefficient p consists of a as p11 = a,, . an-i ... a 2 • a1 • The values 
of p is given. Thus, p1 = Pi_ • It is obvious that a 1 = Pi_ . With the assumption that p11 = a,, . a,,_1 ••• a 2 • a1 , 
From these procedures, the obtained transport coefficient matrix is as shown in Table A.9. The remaining 
transport coefficients are classified by two groups. The first group is G-group which consists of the 
coefficients from n to n . The second group is B-group which consists of the coefficients between the 
bordering regions. By the definition, the coefficient values of G group are obtained from the formula 
(1 - an) . Assume that the bordering region j is affected from the bordering region i by the formula that 
ap=(I-au)(ail} From these procedures, (13x13) transport coefficient matrix is obtained as shown in 
Figure A.6. 
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Table A.9 Transport Coefficient Construction Procedure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
G1 0.000 B3.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 G2 0.000 B4.2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bl.3 0.000 G3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 B2.4 0.000 G4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 G5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 G6 B7.6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 B6.7 G7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.360 0.369 0.390 0.409 0.000 0.000 0.000 G8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.000 0.000 G9 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.090 0.092 0.097 0.102 0.000 0.209 0.247 0.249 0.000 GlO 0.000 0.000 
0.070 0.072 0.076 0.080 0.176 0.164 0.194 0.195 0.000 0.783 Gl 1 0.000 
0.068 0.070 0.074 0.077 0.170 0.159 0.188 0.189 0.498 0.759 0.969 G12 
0.058 0.060 0.063 0.066 0.096 0.136 0.161 0.162 0.428 0.652 0.832 0.858 
Figure A.6 Transport Coefficient Matrix 
0.910 0.000 0.907 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.908 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.907 0.000 0.903 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.083 0.000 0.898 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.776 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.791 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.157 0.753 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.360 0.369 0.390 0.409 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.751 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.502 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.090 0.092 0.097 0.102 0.000 0.209 0.247 0.249 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.070 0.072 0.076 0.080 0.176 0.164 0.194 0.195 0.000 0.783 0.0310.0000.000 
0.068 0.070 0.074 0.077 0.170 0.159 0.188 0.189 0.498 0.759 0.969 0.142 0.000 
0.058 0.060 0.063 0.066 0.096 0.136 0.161 0.162 0.428 0.652 0.832 0.858 1.000 
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The availability of data after constructing data is as shown in Table A.10. 
Table A.10 Status of Data after Data Construction 
Transport coefficients (T) Emissions (E) WWTP Cost ( C) 
1 Prairie Grove (AR) 1 ARK04A(AR) I TAHLEQUAH (OK) 
2 ROGERS (AR) 2 ARK05 (AR) 2 ROGERS (AR) 
3 Fayetteville (AR) 3 ARK06 (AR) 3 Fayetteville (AR) 
4 SPRINGDALE (AR) 4 ARKO? (AR) 4 SPRINGDALE (AR) 
5 Lincoln (AR) 5 Watts (OK) 5 Siloam Springs (AR) 
6 GENTRY(AR) 6 TAHLEQUAH (OK) 
7 Siloam Springs (AR) 7 Kansas (OK) 
8 Watts (OK) 8 Eldon (OK) 
9 WESTVILLE (OK) 9 Rogers (AR) 
10 Midwestern Nursery (OK) 10 Springdale (AR) 
11 TAHLEQUAH (OK) 
12 Cherokee Nation (OK) 
The fmal step is to select sub-regions for numerical application. The selected sub-regions should include 
more than two sub-regions which are bordered each other. If this requirement is not satisfied by available 
data sets, the numerical application cannot generate all possible results. When the requirement is 
considered, the availability of data is as shown in Figure A.7. There are four complete data sets which 
include two bordered sub-regions. Finally, three sub-regions of AR and one region of OK are selected for 
numerical application. The data sets are used for Chapter V and Appendix D,E. 
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Figure A.7 Data Availability and Regional Selection 
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APPENDIX D: NUMERICAL APPLICATION 
Table 5.1 Parameters and Initial Levels 
E; r (million$) a p Jr i 
(ton/Yr) ($/ Kg) (dollar/ton') ($/ton) 
I 27 4 47.3 8.44 52.1 
2 55 7 47.3 7.87 52.6 
3 95 2 4.4 0.15 5.9 
4 50 2 2.3 0.02 74.6 
a e . T bl 5 2 T rans1 )Or oe 1c1en s tC ffi' t 
~ I 2 3 4 R g :g: (f) 
1 0.908 0.093 0.000 0.000 
2 0.083 0.898 0.000 0.000 
3 0.000 0.000 0.753 0.000 
4 0.072 0.080 0.194 0.031 
Figure A.8 Abatement Cost Sharing Parameter 
0.829 0.083 0.000 0.000 
a .. 1r. 0.077 0.814 0.000 0.000 () .. = !} l 
= 
!} In 0.000 0.000 0.234 0.000 k=I a/gtrk 
0.094 0.103 0.766 1.000 
Table 5.4 Costs Reduction Without/With Transfers (m.$) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
_, .. _ .......................................... ---·-- .. ,-............................................. _ .. ___ ...................... _. ,_ .. ,, ....................................... ____ .................... .. 
(J,T (E') - J,T (E)) (J;(E')-J;(E)) J;(E') J{(E')-J{(E) 
J{(E) 
SR-1 -0.5 -2.l -2.6 -0.17% 
SR-2 1.2 -4.4 -3.2 -0.12% 
SR-3 338.5 -406.4 -67.9 -534.87% 
SR-4 -684.2 413.0 -271.3 -11.44% 
Total -345.0 0.0 -345.0 -5.20% 
77 
Table A.11 Total Costs (l;(E')-l;(E)) per Region (m.$) 
AR OK 
SR-1 SR-2 
-0.5 1.2 
339.2 
Relevant Equations 
i=l,··,4. 
Q=AE, 
[
0.908 
0.083 
A= 
0.000 
0.072 
4 
0.093 0.000 0.000] E = [:25. :7] 0.898 0.000 0.000 , 
0.000 0.753 0.000 
0.080 0.194 0.031 
Q;(E) = I>ijE} J = 1,-· ·,4. 
j=l 
D=1Z"Q 
4 
D;(E)=1Z";Q =1l";L_aijE1 
}=I 
Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium Condition 
7l".=a; 
I 
Cooperative Equilibrium Condition 
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APPENDIX E: RESULTS BY SCENARIO 
Table A.12 Evolution of P Emissions (ton/Yr) 
3% Reduction 
SR-1 
26.84 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
SR-2 SR-3 
54.97 94.50 
54.28 91.67 
54.28 88.92 
54.28 86.25 
54.28 83.66 
54.28 81.15 
54.28 78.72 
54.28 76.36 
54.28 74.07 
54.28 71.84 
54.28 69.69 
54.28 67.60 
54.28 65.57 
54.28 63.60 
54.28 61.70 
54.28 59.84 
54.28 58.05 
54.28 56.31 
54.28 54.62 
54.28 52.98 
54.28 51.39 
54.28 49.85 
54.28 48.35 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
Evolution of P Emissions 
3% Reduction 
SR-4 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
49.80 
------Q------- SR-1 -----.&-----SR-2 -----sR-3 --a--SR-4 
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Figure A.IO 
Table A.13 Evolution of Total Costs per Region (m$) 
3% Reduction 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
SR-I SR-2 SR-3 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
-0.5 1.2 1.2 
-0.5 1.2 4.8 
-0.5 1.2 10.5 
-0.5 1.2 18.2 
-0.5 1.2 27.6 
-0.5 1.2 38.6 
-0.5 1.2 51.0 
-0.5 1.2 64.6 
-0.5 1.2 79.5 
-0.5 1.2 95.3 
-0.5 1.2 112.0 
-0.5 1.2 129.6 
-0.5 1.2 147.8 
-0.5 1.2 166.6 
-0.5 1.2 185.9 
-0.5 1.2 205.7 
-0.5 1.2 225.8 
-0.5 1.2 246.2 
-0.5 1.2 266.8 
-0.5 1.2 287.7 
-0.5 1.2 308.6 
-0.5 1.2 329.6 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
Evolution of Total Costs per Region 
(3% Reduction) 
SR-4 
0.0 
-48.2 
-88.0 
-126.7 
-164.1 
-200.5 
-235.7 
-269.9 
-303.0 
-335.2 
-366.4 
-396.7 
-426.0 
-454.5 
-482.1 
-508.9 
-534.9 
-560.1 
-584.6 
-608.3 
-631.3 
-653.6 
-675.3 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
400-r---------------------------------, 
300 
200, 
100 
-100 
-200 
-300 
-500 
-600 
-700 
-aoo~-----~-------~~------~~~------~ 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
-e---SR-1 ···•· ·· SR-2 • SR-3 ----G-- SR-4 
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Figure A.11 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
-100 
-200 
-300 
-400 
-500 
Table A.14 Financial Transfers (m$) 
3% Reduction 
SR-1 SR-2 SR-3 
0 0 0 
-2 -4 -11 
-2 -4 -23 
-2 -4 -36 
-2 -4 -51 
-2 -4 -66 
-2 -4 -83 
-2 -4 -100 
-2 -4 -119 
-2 -4 -138 
-2 -4 -157 
-2 -4 -177 
-2 -4 -197 
-2 -4 -218 
-2 -4 -239 
-2 -4 -260 
-2 -4 -281 
-2 -4 -302 
-2 -4 -324 
-2 -4 -345 
-2 -4 -366 
-2 -4 -388 
-2 -4 -409 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
Evolution of Transfers per Region 
(3% Reduction) 
SR-4 
0 
17 
29 
43 
57 
73 
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144 
164 
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FigureA.12 
Table A.15 Evolution of P Emissions 
5% Reduction 
SR-I 
26.84 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
SR-2 SR-3 
54.97 94.50 
54.28 89.78 
54.28 85.29 
54.28 81.03 
54.28 76.97 
54.28 73.13 
54.28 69.47 
54.28 66.00 
54.28 62.70 
54.28 59.56 
54.28 56.58 
54.28 53.75 
54.28 51.07 
54.28 48.51 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
Evolution of P Emissions 
5% Reduction 
· SR-4 
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FigureA.13 
Table A.16 Evolution of Total Costs per Region 
5% Reduction 
SR-I SR-2 SR-3 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
-0.5 1.2 3.5 
-0.5 1.2 13.l 
-0.5 1.2 28.1 
-0.5 1.2 47.6 
-0.5 1.2 70.7 
-0.5 1.2 97.0 
-0.5 1.2 125.8 
-0.5 1.2 156.6 
-0.5 1.2 189.0 
-0.5 1.2 222.5 
-0.5 1.2 257.0 
-0.5 1.2 292.0 
-0.5 1.2 327.3 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
-0.5 1.2 338.5 
Evolution of Total Costs per Region 
(5% Reduction) 
SR-4 
0.0 
-75.6 
-140.6 
-202.3 
-261.0 
-316.7 
-369.6 
-419.9 
-467.7 
-513.0 
-556.1 
-597.1 
-636.0 
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-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
-684.2 
400-,------------------------------~ 
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200 
100 
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-200 
-300 
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Figure A.14 
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Table A.17 Financial Transfers 
5% Reduction 
SR-I SR-2 SR-3 
0 0 0 
-2 -4 -19 
-2 -4 -41 
-2 -4 -67 
-2 -4 -96 
-2 -4 -127 
-2 -4 -159 
-2 -4 -193 
-2 -4 -228 
-2 -4 -263 
-2 -4 -299 
-2 -4 -335 
-2 -4 -371 
-2 -4 -406 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
Evolution of Transfers per Region 
(5% Reduction) 
SR-4 
0 
25 
48 
74 
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133 
166 
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Figure A.15 
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Table A.18 Evolution of P Emissions 
10% Reduction 
SR-I 
26.84 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
26.26 
SR-2 SR-3 
54.97 94.50 
54.28 85.05 
54.28 76.55 
54.28 68.89 
54.28 62.00 
54.28 55.80 
54.28 50.22 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
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54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
54.28 47.73 
Evolution of P Emissions 
(10% Reduction) 
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Figure A.16 
Table A.19 Evolution of Total Costs per Region 
10% Reduction 
SR-I SR-2 SR-3 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.50 1.18 13.82 
-0.50 1.18 49.90 
-0.50 1.18 101.51 
-0.50 1.18 163.46 
-0.50 1.18 231.78 
-0.50 1.18 303.45 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
-0.50 1.18 338.53 
Evolution of Total Costs per Region 
(10% Reduction) 
SR-4 
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FigureA.17 
Table A.20 Financial Transfers 
10% Reduction 
SR-I SR-2 SR-3 
0 0 0 
-2 -4 -43 
-2 -4 -99 
-2 -4 -164 
-2 -4 -235 
-2 -4 -309 
-2 -4 -382 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
-2 -4 -418 
Evolution of Transfers per Region 
(10% Reduction) 
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